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Abstract
We study a stochastic economy where both employed and unemployed workers
search randomly for labor contracts posted by ﬁrms, while aggregate productivity is
subject to persistent shocks. Our exercise provides the ﬁrst dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium analysis of a popular class of search wage-posting models, drawing in
part from the literature on recursive contracts under moral hazard. Each ﬁrm oﬀers
and commits to a (Markov) contract, which speciﬁes a wage contingent on all payoﬀ-
relevant states, but must pay equally all of its workers, who have limited commitment
and are free to quit at any time. An equilibrium of this contract-posting game is Rank-
Preserving [RP] if larger ﬁrms oﬀer a larger value to their workers in all states of the
world. We ﬁnd two suﬃcient (but not necessary) conditions for every equilibrium to
be RP: either ﬁrms only diﬀer in their initial size, or they also diﬀer in their ﬁxed id-
iosyncratic productivity but more productive ﬁrms are initially weakly larger, in which
case turnover is always eﬃcient, as workers always move from less to more productive
ﬁrms. In both cases, the ranking of ﬁrm sizes never changes on the RP equilibrium
path, a property that has three useful implications. First, the stochastic dynamics of
ﬁrm size, uniquely pinned down in equilibrium, provide an intuitive explanation for
the empirical ﬁnding that large employers are more cyclically sensitive (Moscarini and
Postel-Vinay, 2009). Second, contracts are unique in RP equilibrium. Third, RP equi-
librium computation is tractable, and we construct and simulate calibrated examples.
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1 Introduction
We study the equilibrium dynamics of a frictional labor market where ﬁrms oﬀer and commit
to employment contracts and workers search randomly on and oﬀ the job for those contracts,
while aggregate productivity is subject to persistent shocks. In a broad sense, our exercise
sheds light on the long-term contracts that emerge in a market equilibrium environment,
in the presence of moral hazard and aggregate uncertainty. More speciﬁcally, we perform
the ﬁrst analysis of aggregate stochastic dynamics in a popular class of search wage-posting
models, originating with Burdett and Mortensen (1998, henceforth BM). By providing a
coherent formalization of the hypothesis that cross-sectional wage dispersion is largely a
consequence of labor market frictions, the BM model has started a fruitful line of research
in the analysis of wage inequality and worker turnover, as the vibrant and empirically very
successful literature organized around that hypothesis continues to show (see Mortensen,
2003 for an overview).
That literature, however, is invariably cast in deterministic steady state. Ever since the
ﬁrst formulation of the BM model, job search scholars have regarded the characterization of
its out-of-steady-state behavior as a daunting problem, essentially because one of the model’s
state variables, which is also the main object of interest, is the endogenous distribution of
wage (or job value) oﬀers. This is an inﬁnite-dimensional object, endogenously determined in
equilibrium as the distribution across ﬁrms of oﬀer strategies that are mutual best responses,
and evolving stochastically with the aggregate impulse. In this paper, we solve this problem.
We show that, under mild suﬃcient conditions, the economy under investigation has
a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the workers’ ranking of ﬁrms is the same in
all aggregate states — what we call a Rank-Preserving Equilibrium (RPE). The suﬃcient
conditions are that ﬁrms either are equally productive, or diﬀer in the permanent component
of their productivity and the more productive they are, the (weakly) more workers they
initially employ — for example, they all start empty. In the latter case, in RPE more
productive ﬁrms oﬀer a larger value and employ more workers at all points in time: when
given a chance, a worker always moves from a less into a more productive ﬁrm, so that
the equilibrium allocation of employment is constrained eﬃcient. This parallels a similar
property of BM’s static equilibrium.
To illustrate and qualify our contributions we now provide details about the economy that
we study, our solution method, and the nature of the unique equilibrium. Inﬁnitely lived
and risk neutral ﬁrms and workers come in contact infrequently. Firms produce homogenous
output with labor in a linear technology, which may permanently diﬀer across ﬁrms. Aggre-
gate multiplicative TFP shocks aﬀect labor productivity as well as the job contact rates, on
1and oﬀ the job, the exogenous job destruction rate, and the value of leisure.
In this economy, the constrained eﬃcient allocation is easily characterized. When given
the opportunity, an employed worker is moved from a less productive to a weakly more
productive ﬁrm. We abstract from issues of entry and exit and restrict attention to parameter
conﬁgurations such that, as in BM, employment is always preferred to unemployment. This
eﬃcient turnover behavior describes a simple Markov process for the evolution of the ﬁrm
size distribution. If we shut down aggregate shocks, from any initial condition which gives
rise to RPE this process converges deterministically to the size distribution that BM found
by solving directly for the stationary distribution. In a stochastic environment, for any
history of aggregate shocks, we can solve in closed form for the path of the socially optimal
distribution of employment across ﬁrms, thus of the size of each ﬁrm type.
The next step is equilibrium analysis. We assume that ﬁrms oﬀer and commit to a
contract which conditions the wage on all possible relevant states and is subject to an equal-
treatment constraint: it must pay the same wage in a given period to all of its employees,
whether incumbent, newly hired from unemployment or from employment. This constraint
indeed deﬁnes the boundaries of a ﬁrm. Workers cannot commit not to quit to other jobs
when the opportunity arises, or to unemployment whenever they please, so commitment is
one-sided and ﬁrms face a standard moral hazard problem. Contract oﬀers are privately
observed only by the recipients, thus deviations cannot be detected by other players.
We look for a Sequential Nash equilibrium of this contract-posting game. We ﬁnd the
largest state space on which equilibrium contracts can be conditioned. For tractability,
we then restrict attention to a Markov Perfect equilibrium, where wages depend only on
payoﬀ-relevant states: two exogenous, the productivity of the ﬁrm and the state of aggregate
productivity, one endogenous to the ﬁrm, its current size, and one endogenous to the economy
but exogenous to the ﬁrm, the distribution of employment across all ﬁrms. A ﬁrm must track
this inﬁnitely-dimensional object in order to know the distributions of competing oﬀers and
of values earned by currently employed workers, thus how much recruitment and retention
its own contract will generate. Equilibrium only imposes two very weak restrictions on these
two distributions: they must have no atoms and a connected support. Yet we are able
to establish that at most one Markov perfect equilibrium exists, characterize that unique
equilibrium and show that it decentralizes the constrained eﬃcient allocation.
The key step in our analysis is a comparative dynamics property of the best-response.
We show that, at any node in the game and for any distribution of oﬀers made by other ﬁrms
and of values earned by employed workers, a more productive and/or larger ﬁrm optimally
oﬀers a contract that pays its existing and new workers a larger value. Therefore, if ﬁrms
are homogeneous, or if more productive ﬁrms are initially no smaller, then no ﬁrm wants
2to break ranks in the distribution of competing oﬀers, which then coincides with the given
distribution of ﬁrm productivities or initial sizes. This immediately implies our main result
that equilibrium, if it exists, is unique and RP, thus constrained eﬃcient.
The intuition behind this comparative dynamics property of the best-response contract
parallels a single-crossing property of the static BM model. There, a more productive ﬁrm
gains more from employing a worker, hence wants to (and can) pay a higher wage. In addi-
tion, under the equal treatment constraint, the eﬀect of the wage on retention is proportional
to own size, while that on hiring is independent of size. Finally, size increases in the wage
due to its eﬀect on recruitment and retention. Thus, ceteris paribus, a larger ﬁrm also wants
to pay more. This intuition does not extend immediately to our dynamic stochastic setting,
because ﬁrm size is an evolving state variable with a given initial condition. The dynamic
incentives of a ﬁrm to pay more or less T periods down the road depend on its size at T,
which in turn is determined by the contract given the history of shocks before time T. If
more productive ﬁrms are initially weakly larger, this initial size ranking self-perpetuates on
the equilibrium path, as required by RPE. More productive ﬁrms always pay and employ
more. While this outcome is intuitive and natural, we ﬁnd it remarkable that it is unique
despite the strong strategic complementarity of a wage-posting game.
As a by-product of this analysis we oﬀer a methodological contribution, namely the ﬁrst
(to the best of our knowledge) theory of Monotone Comparative Dynamics in a dynamic
stochastic decision problem. In our setting, ﬁrms solve a fully dynamic problem in a changing
environment. In the sequential formulation of this problem, the choice set is an inﬁnite
sequence (a stochastic process), a case that the theory of Monotone Comparative Statics
(Topkis, 1998) does not cover. The objective function of the one-step Bellman maximization
contains the value function of the problem, whose properties are ex ante unknown. We
establish that the Bellman operator of the contract-posting problem is a contraction on the
space of functions that satisfy some single-crossing and convexity properties, which are then
inherited by the value function. We can then apply Monotone Comparative Statics to the
Bellman equation and a forward induction argument to prove the Monotone Comparative
Dynamics properties of the best response illustrated above. The same logic can be applied
in many other settings: for example, one may ask in a stochastic growth model whether the
socially optimal level of investment is decreasing at all states and dates in the initial stock of
capital, in the labor share, or in risk aversion; in each case, one must track the eﬀect of the
parameter change on the endogenous state variable (capital) along the entire optimal path.
One ﬁnal, and crucial, beneﬁt of RPE is its tractability and computability. As employ-
ment allocation is constrained eﬃcient, we can solve for it analytically, which aﬀords a direct
proof of uniqueness of the equilibrium allocation. To compute equilibrium contracts, we fur-
3ther establish that the ﬁrm value function and best-response contract are diﬀerentiable in
ﬁrm productivity and size, a non-trivial property because the distributions of oﬀers that the
ﬁrm responds to may lack a density at many points. Next, using ﬁrst-order conditions and
Euler equations solved by optimal contracts, we obtain our third and ﬁnal contribution: we
establish uniqueness and a suﬃcient condition for existence of the equilibrium contract, fur-
ther suggesting an algorithm to compute state-contingent wages, thus a constructive proof of
equilibrium existence. We ﬁnally calibrate and simulate the model. This numerical exercise,
albeit mostly illustrative, reveals the quantitative potential of the model.
Besides being of intrinsic theoretical interest, our characterization of the dynamics of the
BM model opens the analysis of aggregate labor market dynamics as a whole potential new
ﬁeld of application of search/wage-posting models. Unlike the typical representative-agent
model, our stochastic version of these models makes predictions about the business cycle
behavior of wage distributions, ﬁrm size distributions, or patterns of labor reallocation across
ﬁrms, that we can confront with new empirical evidence from various (often new) data sets
presented in Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2009, MPV09). Our model already explains many
of these new facts, most notably that large employers have more cyclical employment, and
the results of our numerical analysis suggest extensions to further improve its quantitative
performance. More generally, we hope to contribute to a synthesis between the BM contract-
posting approach and the “other”, equally successful side of the search literature, organized
around the matching framework (Pissarides, 2000), initially designed for the understanding
of equilibrium unemployment and labor market ﬂows.1
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we lay out the basic envi-
ronment. In Section 3 we characterize the constrained eﬃcient allocation. In Section 4 we
describe and formally deﬁne an equilibrium. We then introduce the notion of Rank Preserv-
ing Equilibrium in Section 5, where we also state our main result about the generality of RPE
and give a characterization of RPE, together with uniqueness and existence results. Section 6
shows simulations of equilibrium paths for wages and employment in a RPE. Finally, Section
7 concludes by discussing future extensions of the model.
1Rudanko (2008) and Menzio and Shi (2008) analyze wage contract-posting models with aggregate pro-
ductivity shocks, where job search is directed. The latter assumption greatly simpliﬁes the analysis by
severing the link between the individual ﬁrm’s contract-posting problem and the distribution of contract
oﬀers. This is the main hurdle that we face, and that we resolve by exploiting the emergence of Rank-
Preserving Equilibria, while maintaining BM’s assumption of random search common to the vast majority of
the search literature. From a theoretical viewpoint, we see both programs as fruitful directions of exploration.
From a quantitative viewpoint, the directed search approach is focused on the response of the job-ﬁnding
rate to aggregate shocks, and does not generate a well-deﬁned notion of employer size. Hence, it is silent
on the wealth of new evidence that we oﬀer in MPV09 on cyclical patterns of the employer size/growth
relationship, and that we envision as central to our understanding of the propagation of aggregate shocks in
labor markets.
42 The economy
We study a stochastic economy where ﬁrms commit to employment contracts and workers
search randomly for those contracts. The special case of a stationary and deterministic
economy where contracts are restricted to a constant wage is the BM wage posting model
with heterogeneous ﬁrm types. We present our model in discrete time, as it aﬀords more
clarity in the presentation of the contract posting problem under one-sided commitment as
a recursive problem.
The labor market is populated by a unit-mass of workers, who can be either employed or
unemployed, and by a unit measure of ﬁrms.2 Workers and ﬁrms are risk neutral, inﬁnitely
lived, and maximize payoﬀs discounted with factor β ∈ (0,1). Firms operate constant-
return technologies with labor as the only input and with productivity scale ωθ, where ω is
an aggregate component, evolving within some bounded set of values Ω ⊂ R+ according to a
discrete-time stationary ﬁrst-order Markov process H (dω0 | ω), and θ is a ﬁxed, ﬁrm-speciﬁc
component, distributed across ﬁrms θ according to a cdf Γ over
£
θ,θ
¤
⊂ R+.
The labor market is aﬀected by search frictions in that unemployed workers can only
sample job oﬀers sequentially with some probability λω
0 ∈ (0,1) each period. Employed
workers earn a wage, are allowed to search on the job, and face a per-period sampling chance
of job oﬀers of λω
1 ∈ (0,1). For notational simplicity we will assume uniform sampling of
ﬁrms by workers, in that any worker receiving a job oﬀer draws the type of the ﬁrm from
which the oﬀer emanates from the distribution Γ(·).3 All ﬁrms of equal productivity θ start
out with the same labor force. We denote by Λ0 (θ) the measure of employment initially at
ﬁrms of productivity at most θ. Each employed worker is separated from his employer and
enters unemployment every period with probability δω ∈ (0,1). Note that all these transition
probabilities, although exogenous, are allowed to depend on the aggregate state ω.
In each period, the timing is as follows. Given a current state ω of aggregate labor
productivity and size (measure of workers employed) L:
1. production and payments take place at all ﬁrms in current state ω; the ﬂow beneﬁt bω
accrues to unemployed workers;
2. the new state ω0 of aggregate labor productivity is realized;
2We implicitly ﬁx the measure of active ﬁrms, thus remaining mostly silent on the question of entry and
exit. A simple extension of the model to make it capture entry and exit of ﬁrms over the business cycle is
illustrated in our companion paper Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2008, MPV08). Finally, that the mass of
ﬁrms and workers both have measure one is obviously innocuous and only there to simplify the notation.
3When calibrating and simulating the model in Section 6 we allow for non-uniform sampling, in that
diﬀerent types-θ ﬁrms have diﬀerent chances of being sampled by job searchers. This extension is theoretically
straightforward and useful in quantitative applications.
53. employed workers can quit to unemployment;
4. jobs are destroyed exogenously with chance δω0;
5. the remaining employed workers receive an outside oﬀer with chance λω0
1 and decide
whether to accept it or to stay with the current employer;
6. each previously unemployed worker receives an oﬀer with probability λω0
0 .
Finally, in order to avert unnecessary complication, we will assume throughout the paper
that the distribution of ﬁrm types, Γ, has continuous and everywhere strictly positive density
over
£
θ,θ
¤
, and that the initial measure of employment across ﬁrm types, Λ0, is continuously
diﬀerentiable in θ. Combining those two assumptions, we obtain that the initial average size
of a type-θ ﬁrm, which is given by L0 (θ) =
dΛ0(θ)/dθ
γ(θ) , is a continuous function of θ.
3 The constrained eﬃcient allocation
A social planner constrained by the same search frictions as private agents only has to decide
which transition opportunities to take up and which ones to ignore. Recall that opportunities
to move from unemployment to employment or from job to job only arise infrequently due
to search frictions, while the option to move workers into unemployment is always available.
In this paper we will only consider the simple case where the planner never ﬁnds it optimal
to exercise the latter option, because the value of leisure bω is suﬃciently lower than the
productivity of any existing ﬁrm in all states and/or because employed search is suﬃciently
eﬀective relative to unemployed search. The important question of employer entry and exit
is left for future research.
The constrained eﬃcient allocation is then simple enough to characterize. Let L? (θ)
denote the density of workers eﬃciently allocated to a typical type-θ ﬁrm and Λ? (θ) =
R θ
θ L? (x)dΓ(x) the corresponding cumulated measure up to θ, so that the unemployment
rate is u? = 1−Λ? ¡
θ
¢
. Under our assumption that productivity is always large enough that
employment in any ﬁrm is always socially superior to unemployment, the planner will take
up any opportunity to move an unemployed worker into employment, and unemployment
evolves according to u?0 = δω0 (1 − u?)+
¡
1 − λω0
0
¢
u?, where primes denote next-period values.
Moreover, the planner always seeks to move employed workers from less productive toward
more productive ﬁrms. Appealing to a Large Numbers approximation, this induces the
following simple Markov process for the evolution of eﬃcient ﬁrm size:
L
? (θ)
0 = L
? (θ)
³
1 − δ
ω0´³
1 − λ
ω0
1 Γ(θ)
´
+ λ
ω0
0
¡
1 − Λ
? ¡
θ
¢¢
+ λ
ω0
1
³
1 − δ
ω0´
Λ
? (θ). (1)
6Given new aggregate state ω0, of the L? (θ) workers initially employed by this ﬁrm, a fraction
¡
1 − δω0¢
are not separated exogenously into unemployment. Of these survivors, a fraction
λω0
1 receive an opportunity to move to another ﬁrm. The planner exercises that option if
and only if the new ﬁrm is more productive than θ, which is the case with probability
Γ(θ) := 1 − Γ(θ). Initially unemployed workers u? = 1 − Λ? ¡
θ
¢
ﬁnd jobs with chance
λω0
0 . Workers employed at other ﬁrms who have not lost their jobs draw with chance λω0
1 an
opportunity to move to the type-θ ﬁrm, that the planner exploits if and only if the ﬁrm they
currently work at has productivity x < θ. The measure of such workers is
¡
1 − δω0¢
Λ? (θ).
Multiplying through by γ (θ) in (1) and integrating with respect to θ yields:
Λ
? (θ)
0 = λ
ω0
0 u
?Γ(θ) +
³
1 − δ
ω0´³
1 − λ
ω0
1 Γ(θ)
´
Λ
? (θ).
To solve this equation forward in time we introduce a time index t. For any initial condition
Λ?
0 (θ) at some (renormalized) initial date 0 such that the aggregate state last switched to ω
at time 0 and then remained at ω between 0 and t, or just the given initial Λ0 (θ) when time
starts running, the law of motion of Λ? is a ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equation which solves as:
Λ
?
t (θ) =
£
(1 − δ
ω)
¡
1 − λ
ω
1Γ(θ)
¢¤t
Λ
?
0 (θ) + λ0Γ(θ)
t X
s=1
£
(1 − δ
ω)
¡
1 − λ
ω
1Γ(θ)
¢¤s−1
u
?
t−s. (2)
By inspection, Λ?
t (θ) is diﬀerentiable in θ at all dates t, and one obtains a closed-form
expression for the eﬃcient workforce of any type-θ ﬁrm:
L
?
t (θ) =
dΛ?
t (θ)/dθ
γ (θ)
= (1 − δ
ω)
t ¡
1 − λ
ω
1Γ(θ)
¢t−1 £¡
1 − λ
ω
1Γ(θ)
¢
L
?
0 (θ) + tλ
ω
1Λ
?
0 (θ)
¤
+ λ
ω
0
(
u
?
t−1 +
t X
s=2
(1 − δ
ω)
s−1 ¡
1 − λ
ω
1Γ(θ)
¢s−2
[1 − λ
ω
1 + λ
ω
1sΓ(θ)]u
?
t−s
)
, (3)
where L?
0 (θ) was the value of this solution under state b ω at the time of the last state switch
from b ω to ω, and again u?
s = 1 − Λ?
s
¡
θ
¢
.
If the aggregate state forever stays at ω, the solutions to (2) and (3) converge to:
Λ
?
∞ (θ) =
δωλω
0
δω + λω
0
·
Γ(θ)
1 − (1 − δω)
¡
1 − λω
1Γ(θ)
¢
and (4)
L
?
∞ (θ) =
δωλω
0
δω + λω
0
·
1 − (1 − δω)(1 − λω
1)
£
1 − (1 − δω)
¡
1 − λω
1Γ(θ)
¢¤2
which are the familiar steady-state expressions found in the BM model.
As is well known and immediately veriﬁable from (4), more productive ﬁrms are larger and
the normalized distribution of employment across ﬁrm types Λ?
∞ (θ)/Λ?
∞
¡
θ
¢
is increasing,
7in the sense of stochastic dominance, in λω
1, and decreasing in δω. Intuitively, workers
upgrade to higher-θ ﬁrms whenever possible, and are able to do so in larger numbers if they
receive more opportunities to do so (higher λω
1) or if they get thrown oﬀ the job ladder into
unemployment less often (lower δω), in which case the stationary employment distribution
is even more skewed towards large ﬁrms. This comparative statics property is reﬂected in
the dynamic behavior of the employment distribution by ﬁrm size, as we illustrate with
numerical examples in Section 6. There we assume, as is consistent with empirical evidence
on job-to-job quits and job separations, that λω
1 is increasing, and δω decreasing in the
state of aggregate productivity ω, and, as is suggested by empirical evidence on the size-
productivity relationship (and as is in our model’s steady state), that more productive ﬁrms
initially employ more workers. Then, hitting the economy with a randomly drawn sequence
of aggregate shocks, we ﬁnd that large employers are more cyclically sensitive, because they
gain workers faster over an aggregate expansion as job upgrading accelerates, and vice versa
in a slump. This property of the eﬃcient allocation exactly replicates the new empirical
evidence that we document in MPV09.
4 Equilibrium
4.1 Deﬁnition
Each ﬁrm chooses and commits to an employment contract, namely a state-contingent wage
depending on some state variable ζ, to maximize the present discounted value of proﬁts,
given other ﬁrms’ contract oﬀers. The ﬁrm is further subjected to an equal treatment con-
straint, whereby it must pay the same wage to all its workers. This is the sense in which we
generalize the BM restrictions placed on the set of feasible wage contracts to a non-steady-
state environment.4 Under commitment, such a wage function implies a value V for any
worker to work for that ﬁrm, which is also a function of the state ζ. For reasons that will
become clear shortly, we assume that a contract oﬀered by a ﬁrm to its workers is observable
only by the parties involved.
Let Z be the (Borel-)measurable set of all histories of play in the game, and VZ the set
of measurable functions
£
θ,θ
¤
×Z → R. A behavioral strategy of the contract-posting game
4We thus rule out, among other things, wage-tenure contracts (Stevens, 2004; Burdett and Coles, 2003),
oﬀer-matching or individual bargaining (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002; Dey and Flinn, 2005; Cahuc, Postel-
Vinay and Robin, 2006), contracts conditioned on employment status (Carrillo-Tudela, 2009). Note, however,
that the model can be generalized to allow for time-varying individual heterogeneity under the assumption
that ﬁrms oﬀer the type of piece-rate contracts described in Barlevy (2008). In that sense experience and/or
tenure eﬀects can be introduced into the model. Shimer (2008) proposes an alternative formulation, which
maintains BM’s restriction of a constant posted wage, even out of steady state, and delivers a few of the
same results in transitional (non-stochastic) aggregate dynamics.
8is a function V ∈ VZ such that, when the state of the game is ζ ∈ Z, each ﬁrm θ ∈
£
θ,θ
¤
oﬀers value V (θ,ζ) to all of its workers.
As V is measurable, the c.d.f.
F (W | ζ,V ) :=
Z θ
θ
I{V (θ,ζ) ≤ W}dΓ(θ) (5)
is well-deﬁned for every ζ ∈ Z, W ∈ R and I an indicator function. This is the probability
that a randomly drawn ﬁrm oﬀers value no greater than W, given history ζ and given that
all ﬁrms follow strategy V . Let F = 1 − F denote the survival function.
Again, let Λ(θ) be the measure of workers currently employed at all ﬁrms of productivity
up to θ, so Λ
¡
θ
¢
is total employment. For any increasing Λ :
£
θ,θ
¤
→ [0,1], ζ ∈ Z, W ∈ R,
the following c.d.f.
G(W | ζ,Λ,V ) :=
1
Λ
¡
θ
¢ ·
Z θ
θ
I{V (θ,ζ) ≤ W}dΛ(θ) (6)
is also well-deﬁned. This is the probability that a randomly drawn worker is currently earning
value no greater than W after history ζ.
Given a strategy V ∈ VZ followed by all ﬁrms and the resulting F, an unemployed worker
earns a value solving:
U (ζ | V ) = b
ω+βEζ0|ζ
·³
1 − λ
ω0
0
´
U (ζ
0 | V ) + λ
ω0
0
Z
maxhv,U (ζ
0 | V )idF (v | ζ
0,V )
¸
, (7)
because she collects a ﬂow value bω and, one period later, when the aggregate state becomes
ω0, she draws with chance λω0
0 a job oﬀer from the equilibrium distribution of oﬀered values
F, which she accepts if the associated value exceeds that of staying unemployed.
A ﬁrm of current size L which posts a value W in state ζ has size zero next period if
W < U, otherwise, invoking a large numbers approximation, new ﬁrm size is:
L
0 = L (ζ,W | V ) := L
³
1 − δ
ω0´³
1 − λ
ω0
1 F (W | ζ,V )
´
+ λ
ω0
0
£
1 − Λ
¡
θ
¢¤
I{W ≥ U (ζ | V )} + λ
ω0
1
³
1 − δ
ω0´
Λ
¡
θ
¢
G(W | ζ,V ). (8)
After the new aggregate state ω0 is drawn, of the measure L of workers currently employed
by this ﬁrm, a fraction
¡
1 − δω0¢
are not separated exogenously into unemployment. Of these
survivors, a fraction λω0
1 F (W | ζ,V ) quit because they draw from F an outside oﬀer which
gives them a value larger than W. The currently unemployed 1−Λ
¡
θ
¢
ﬁnd jobs with chance
λω0
0 , and accept an oﬀer W from a ﬁrm if this is better than unemployment. By random
matching, each ﬁrm oﬀering more than U receives the same inﬂow from unemployment. The
9employed who have not lost their jobs
¡
1 − δω0¢
Λ
¡
θ
¢
receive an oﬀer with chance λω0
1 , and
accept it if the value W they draw is larger than what they were earning before (probability
G(W | ζ,V )), in which case they quit to this ﬁrm oﬀering W.
Adding up, the cumulated ﬁrm size evolves as the sum of individual ﬁrm sizes on the
equilibrium path. For any θ ∈
£
θ,θ
¤
:
Λ(θ | ζ,V )
0 =
Z θ
θ
L (ζ,V (x,ζ) | V )dΓ(x) ⇒ Λ(· | ζ,V )
0 := T (ζ | V ). (9)
The map T denotes next period’s employment distribution given current state ζ and oﬀer
strategy V . The support of Λ is contained in that of Γ, because no worker can be at a ﬁrm of
type θ if there exists no such ﬁrm. By induction, starting from the initial distribution of em-
ployment and for every history of the game, Λ has a (possibly nil) Radon-Nikodym derivative
dΛ(θ | ζ,V )/dΓ(θ) everywhere in θ, and (9) requires this derivative to be L (ζ,V (θ,ζ) | V ).
Therefore, F and G also exist at all nodes of the game when ﬁrms play the strategy V .
A value strategy W ∈ VZ can also be implemented by a wage strategy w ∈ VZ such that
the worker’s Bellman equation is solved by W given that all other ﬁrms play V : the worker
receives the wage and, next period, the expected value of being either displaced, or retained
at the same ﬁrm, or poached by a higher-paying ﬁrm.
W (θ,ζ) = w(θ,ζ) + βEζ0|ζ
"
δ
ω0
U (ζ
0 | V )
+
³
1 − δ
ω0´µ
W (θ,ζ
0) + λ
ω0
1
Z +∞
W(θ,ζ0)
[v − W (θ,ζ
0)]dF (v | ζ
0,V )
¶¸
(10)
We are now going to deﬁne an equilibrium of the contract-posting game. Each ﬁrm
plays a game against other ﬁrms as well as vis-` a-vis its current and prospective workers.
Workers act sequentially, as they are always free to quit. Firms follow a behavioral strategy
V (a value policy) that must be a best-response against other ﬁrms at any node ζ of the
game, including those reached with probability zero on the equilibrium path. For example,
a ﬁrm may ﬁnd itself losing more workers than predicted by current equilibrium play. This
requires specifying a consistent belief assessment. The constraint of delivering the value to
the workers once hired is binding because, after hiring a worker with a promise of W, the ﬁrm
would like to renege and to squeeze the worker against the participation constraint W = U.
The reputational underpinnings of the ﬁrm’s commitment power have been explored in the
wage-posting literature (Coles, 2001). As is standard, behavioral strategies in the extensive
form dynamic game generate strategy proﬁles of the equivalent static, strategic form game
where each ﬁrm chooses a map once and for all at time 0.
10Our ﬁrst task is to ﬁnd the state space Z on which equilibrium strategies can be con-
ditioned. By assumption, past play by other ﬁrms is unobservable, hence cannot be part
of Z. For the same reason, and because it is small, a ﬁrm takes its competitors’ behavior
(the distributions F and G) as given when choosing a strategy: its own deviations cannot be
detected and be subject to retaliation, so its actions cannot aﬀect the distribution of oﬀers
in the economy. Each ﬁrm can only observe the set Q of public histories of {ω,F,G,Λ}.
We look for the smallest subset Z ⊆ Q which is suﬃcient for Q. For every ζ ∈ Z
and V (·,ζ), the current oﬀer distribution F (· | ζ,V ) is uniquely determined from (5), so it
contains no independent information about ζ. The same is true, from (6), of G(· | ζ,V ),
given ζ, V and Λ. Next, each individual ﬁrm takes the strategy V chosen by others as
given, whether or not this ﬁrm is maximizing, given ζ. Therefore, for every V , a ﬁrm can
calculate the history of Λ based only on the history of ω. That is, each ﬁrm takes the path
of employment at other ﬁrms Λ as an exogenous stochastic process. Hence, for every value-
oﬀering strategy deﬁned on the history of ω and Λ, there exists an equivalent value-oﬀering
strategy deﬁned on the history of ω only, given Λ0, which produces the same payoﬀ relevant
variables for ﬁrm θ. For the purpose of calculating ﬁrm θ’s best response, the history of ω
is suﬃcient for the history of Λ.
The only other independent piece of information that is relevant to a ﬁrm’s proﬁt maxi-
mization is own size L, that is directly controlled by the ﬁrm and has a direct impact on the
ﬁrm’s continuation payoﬀs. Because the history of own size {Ls}
t
s=1 is private information,
it cannot aﬀect values oﬀered by other ﬁrms. Hence only current size Lt can aﬀect the ﬁrm’s
best response, because of its direct impact on proﬁts. We conclude that the only strategically
relevant history for a ﬁrm can be ζt = {ω1,··· ,ωt,Lt}. Clearly, past values of ω cannot be
ruled out of the state space Z, as they are exogenous and public events that ﬁrms can use
to coordinate actions, for example as a public randomization device, although they are no
longer payoﬀ-relevant given the Markov evolution of ω.
Deﬁnition 1 A sequential equilibrium of the contract posting game is a measurable
function V ∈ VZ of, and a set of consistent beliefs over the set Z of histories of the aggregate
productivity state and current size, such that V maximizes the present discounted value of
proﬁts, given that all other ﬁrms also play V and given beliefs. Formally, at least one solution
w ∈ VZ to (10) with W = V also solves:
w(θ,ζ) = argmax
e w
E
"
+∞ X
t=0
β
t (ωtθ − e w(θ,ζt))L (ζt−1,W | V ) | ζ0 = ζ
#
,
where Λt (θ) =
R θ
θ L (ζt−1,V (x,ζt−1) | V )dΓ(x), and F, G, U, W are deﬁned by (5), (6),
(7), (10) with ζ = ζt.
11The equilibrium strategy V is a ﬁxed point in the usual game-theoretic sense: if all ﬁrms
follow V and workers act optimally, then given the implied evolution of the cross-section
distributions of values oﬀered F and earned G and of the value of unemployment U, each
ﬁrm θ’s best response is to follow the same strategy W = V . The strategy is speciﬁed for
every possible public history, and individual deviations are unobservable. Thus, a set of
consistent beliefs is that all other ﬁrms will play according to V after any observed history,
on and oﬀ the equilibrium path.
4.2 Markov perfect equilibrium
Because the history of aggregate productivity is too large a space to be tractable, we look
for equilibria in strategies that depend only on current values of payoﬀ-relevant variables.
From our discussion, it is clear that
ˆ ζ = {θ,L,ω
0,Λ} (11)
is both the smallest and largest such state vector on which equilibrium strategies can depend.
If all ﬁrms condition their current oﬀers on these four objects in ˆ ζ, then from Deﬁnition 1
of equilibrium so should each ﬁrm in its best response. Let V ˆ Z be the space of measurable
functions ˆ Z → R. Then we focus on:
Deﬁnition 2 A Markov perfect equilibrium of the contract posting game is a sequen-
tial equilibrium V in the set V ˆ Z ⊂ VZ, a measurable function of ˆ ζ deﬁned in (11).
Making strategies independent of past values of aggregate productivity comes at the cost of
introducing in the state the current distribution of employment Λ. This is also an inﬁnitely
dimensional object, but it turns out to be much more tractable, as we will see next.
From now on, we let the new value distributions F (· | ω0,Λ) and G(· | ω0,Λ), ﬁrm size
L (L,ω0,Λ,W), employment distribution T (ω0,Λ), and value of unemployment U (ω0,Λ)
be deﬁned as in (5) - (9), with the Markov state in (11) replacing ζ. Notice that only new
ﬁrm size L depends on L; the other objects only depend on the aggregate components of the
state, ω0 and Λ, that each ﬁrm takes as given stochastic processes on and oﬀ the equilibrium
path. That is, ˆ ζ contains only one endogenous (to the ﬁrm) state variable, its own size L.
5 Equilibrium characterization
5.1 The ﬁrm’s contract-posting problem: recursive formulation
We look for a Markov perfect equilibrium of the contract-posting game. Suppose all other
ﬁrms oﬀer a value V (θ,L,ω0,Λ) which depends on own productivity θ, beginning-of-period
12own size L and distribution of employment Λ, and new state of aggregate productivity ω0.
Then, by inspection of the ﬁrm’s sequential proﬁt maximization problem, these four objects
are suﬃcient to pin down the ﬁrm’s best response and evolve according to a Markov process.
Therefore, it is natural to seek a recursive formulation of the ﬁrm’s problem. As is standard
in the contracting literature (Spear and Srivastava, 1987), the ﬁrm’s sequential contracting
problem is equivalent to a recursive problem, in which the ﬁrm takes the value currently
promised to its workers as a state variable, and faces a promise-keeping constraint.
We ﬁx the strategy of other ﬁrms V and omit it from the notation for simplicity. The
ﬁrm can always guarantee itself zero ﬂow proﬁts by making the participation constraint
W (ω0) ≥ U bind and dismissing all workers, so oﬀering any value lower than U is equivalent
to an oﬀer W (ω0) = U. Using the law of motions of own employment and of the aggregate
employment distribution, the ﬁrm solves:
Π
¡
θ,L,ω,Λ,V
¢
= sup
w,W(ω0)≥U(ω0,T (ω0,Λ))
¿
(ωθ − w)L
+ β
Z
Ω
Π[θ,L (L,ω
0,Λ,W (ω
0)),ω
0,T (ω
0,Λ),W (ω
0)]H (dω
0 | ω)
À
(12)
subject to a Promise-Keeping (PK) constraint to deliver the promised V :
V = w + β ·
Z
Ω
(
δ
ω0
U (ω
0,T (ω
0,Λ)) +
³
1 − δ
ω0´
·
"
³
1 − λ
ω0
1 F (W (ω
0) | ω
0,Λ)
´
W (ω
0) + λ
ω0
1
Z +∞
W(ω0)
vdF (v | ω
0,Λ)
#)
H (dω
0 | ω), (13)
where the continuation value on the RHS comes from (10) after a small algebraic manipula-
tion. In (12), given the timing of events, the ﬁrm collects ﬂow revenues, equal to per worker
productivity ωθ times ﬁrm size L, then pays the ﬂow wage w to each worker, then observes
the new state of aggregate productivity ω0, and ﬁnally chooses the continuation contract
(promised value) W (ω0), so that wage and continuation values deliver at least the current
expected value V to the workers.
Notice that at time 0 the ﬁrm could extract full rents by oﬀering w = −∞, because it
is “too late” for the initial workers to quit. To avoid this pathological outcome, we let the
initial wage be chosen according to some bargaining procedure that splits rents from the
contract and leaves the ﬁrm a non-negative cut, so the recursive formulation (12)-(13) only
applies from period t = 1 on. Therefore, V ≥ U (ω,Λ) is always guaranteed, because V is
the value promised a period before under the worker participation constraint W (ω0) ≥ U.
135.2 Properties of F and G in equilibrium
We begin by establishing that the distributions of oﬀered and accepted worker values, F and
G, must satisfy certain general properties in equilibrium, which parallel similar properties of
the corresponding wage distributions in the original BM model.
Proposition 1 (F and G are atomless) In equilibrium F and G must be atomless at all
dates and in all states, with their common support being compact and convex.
To see why there cannot be an atom in F or G, observe that, by the equal treatment
constraint, if F had an atom at some value W, then so would G. But an atom in G would
open the way to a proﬁtable deviation, as in BM. A ﬁrm that is part of the atom that oﬀers
the same W in some state could deviate, oﬀer an epsilon more, win the competition for
employed workers against all other competitors oﬀering W, and poach an additional positive
measure of workers at a negligible marginal cost. This deviation is unproﬁtable only if the
ﬁrm was already oﬀering its workers so much as to break even in expected present discounted
terms. But then a deviation toward oﬀering, e.g., W = U in all states is proﬁtable as all
unemployed workers accept this oﬀer and stay for a while, generating strictly positive proﬁts
for all but the zero measure of ﬁrms with marginal type that break even with W = U.
To see why the support of oﬀered and paid values is convex, observe that if there was
a gap then the lower and upper bounds of this gap would generate the same hiring and
retention, so the same ﬁrm size, but the upper bound would cost the ﬁrm more in terms of
wages, so no ﬁrm would post such an upper bound. To see why the support is compact,
observe that W = maxωθ/(1 − β) is a natural upper bound to the oﬀered value: the ﬁrm
can always do weakly better by oﬀering less than W, as it can hope to make some proﬁts.
So the support is a convex and bounded subset of R+, which we can therefore take to be
compact WLOG.
The properties stated in Proposition 1 will simplify our further characterization of equi-
librium, to which we now turn.
5.3 An equivalent unconstrained recursive formulation
We deﬁne the joint value of the ﬁrm-worker collective as:
S = Π + V L.
14Next solving for the wage from (13) and replacing it into the ﬁrm’s Bellman equation (12)
we see that the joint value function S solves:
S (θ,L,ω,Λ) = ωθL + β
Z
Ω
(
δ
ω0
U (ω
0,T (ω
0,Λ))L
+ max
W(ω0)≥U(ω0,T (ω0,Λ))
*
S (θ,L (L,ω
0,Λ,W (ω
0)),ω
0,T (ω
0,Λ))+L
³
1 − δ
ω0´
λ
ω0
1
Z +∞
W(ω0)
vdF (v | ω
0,Λ)
− W (ω
0)
³
λ
ω0
0
¡
1 − Λ
¡
θ
¢¢
+ λ
ω0
1
³
1 − δ
ω0´
Λ
¡
θ
¢
G(W (ω
0) | ω
0,Λ)
´
+)
H (dω
0 | ω). (14)
Notice that the promised value V does not appear as an argument of S in the above equation:
inspection reveals that the DP problem in (14) is independent of V . Along the optimal path,
the level of current promised utility V only aﬀects the distribution of payoﬀs between the
ﬁrm and its workers, not their overall level S. To see why, observe that the workers’ turnover
decisions only depend on continuation values W (ω0) promised by the ﬁrm, therefore the same
applies to ﬁrm continuation proﬁts Π(ω0). The ﬁrm thus chooses W (ω0) to maximize Π(ω0)
independently of the currently promised value V . Then, to deliver V as promised without
distorting the optimally set future turnover, the ﬁrm adjusts the current wage w.
The optimal policy solving the unconstrained DP problem (14) also solves (12) subject
to (13). We therefore focus on the analysis of the simpler problem (14). An equilibrium is
a solution V that coincides with the one followed by the other ﬁrms. To ﬁnd the equilib-
rium, we proceed as follows. First, we show that under certain suﬃcient conditions a best
response value to any strategy followed by all other ﬁrms must be strictly increasing in own
productivity θ and size L. Next, in that smaller set of monotonic functions we construct an
equilibrium.
5.4 Rank-Preserving Equilibrium (RPE)
While solving for equilibrium directly is an intractable problem because the size distribution
of ﬁrms Λ is an inﬁnitely-dimensional state variable, we can still deﬁne a tractable and
natural class of equilibria, which have the following property. Let L(θ) denote employment
size of a type-θ ﬁrm along the equilibrium path, i.e. the size attained by that ﬁrm given
the initial size distribution at date 0 and given that all ﬁrms have played the equilibrium
strategy from date 0 up to the current date. Then:
Deﬁnition 3 An equilibrium is Rank-Preserving (RP) if a more productive ﬁrm always
pays its workers more: θ 7→ V (θ,L(θ),ω,Λ) is increasing in θ.
15A direct consequence of the above deﬁnition is that in a Rank preserving Equilibrium (RPE)
workers rank their preferences to work for diﬀerent ﬁrms according to ﬁrm productivity at
all dates. The following two properties thus hold true at all dates under the RP assumption:
the proportion of ﬁrms that oﬀer less than V (θ,L(θ),ω,Λ) is simply that proportion of
ﬁrms that are less productive than θ
F (V (θ,L(θ),ω
0,Λ) | ω
0,Λ) ≡ Γ(θ), (15)
and the number of employed workers who earn a value that is lower than that oﬀered by θ
equals employment at ﬁrms less productive than θ:
Λ
¡
θ
¢
G(V (θ,L(θ),ω
0,Λ) | ω
0,Λ) = Λ(θ). (16)
As we will see those restrictions will decisively simplify the calculations involved in solving
for equilibrium in the stochastic model. Moreover, the RP property is theoretically appeal-
ing for at least two more reasons. First, it parallels a well-known property of the static
equilibrium characterized by BM, which is to have a unique equilibrium where workers rank
ﬁrms according to productivity. Second, RPE feature constrained-eﬃcient labor reallocation
at all dates: if workers consistently rank more productive ﬁrms higher than less productive
ones, then job-to-job moves will always be up the productivity ladder. That is, in any RPE
L(θ) = L? (θ) and the allocation is unique.
It is therefore natural to ask how general Rank-Preserving Equilibria are. We now show
that under some weak suﬃcient conditions on the initial size distribution of employment,
all Markov equilibria must have this property. This is the central result of the paper. We
assume that Ω is ﬁnite only for simplicity of exposition and proof, to avoid dealing with
measurability issues, but nothing conceptually depends on this restriction.
Proposition 2 (Ranked initial ﬁrm size implies rank-preserving equilibrium) Assume
Ω is ﬁnite. If at the initial date 0 the initial state of the economy is such that L0 is non-
decreasing in θ (i.e. higher-θ ﬁrms start out no smaller), then any symmetric Markov Perfect
equilibrium of the dynamic value-posting game is necessarily Rank-Preserving, and the initial
ranking of ﬁrms’ relative sizes is maintained on the equilibrium path. If Γ is degenerate and
ﬁrms are equally productive, then the same conclusion holds and initially larger ﬁrms oﬀer
more and remain larger on any equilibrium path.
Although the proof, in Appendix A, is technically quite involved, the proposition has a
simple economic intuition. In BM’s steady-state model, more productive ﬁrms oﬀer higher
wages due to a single-crossing property of their steady state proﬁts, which in turn reﬂects
two very basic economic forces. First, a higher wage implies a larger ﬁrm size, as a more
16generous oﬀer makes it easier to poach workers and to fend oﬀ competition. Second, a larger
ﬁrm size is more valuable to a more productive ﬁrm, because each worker produces more.
Therefore, by a simple monotone comparative statics argument, it must be the case that
more productive ﬁrms oﬀer more, employ more workers, and earn higher proﬁts. Simply
put, a productive ﬁrm can aﬀord paying more, and is willing to do so to attract workers,
because its opportunity cost of not producing is higher. Key to this argument is the fact
that ﬁrm size is an endogenous object, and BM look for an appropriate ﬁrm size distribution
which guarantees a stationary allocation.
In our dynamic model, ﬁrm size is a state variable, and its initial value is a parameter
of the model, arbitrarily ﬁxed, not an endogenous object. Therefore, in order to get a
start on monotone comparative statics, it is suﬃcient (but not necessary) that the initial
size distribution shares the key property of BM’s steady state distribution; namely, it is
increasing in productivity. In the proof, we essentially invoke a single-crossing property of
the maximand (the term in h·i) in the Bellman equation of the modiﬁed but equivalent value-
posting problem (14).5 A more productive ﬁrm still wants and can aﬀord to pay more, now
in terms of values accruing to workers. If initially (or once) larger, this ﬁrm has a further
motive to oﬀer more, namely more workers to retain, independently of its productivity. In
contrast, the eﬀect of a higher oﬀer on successful poaching from other ﬁrms is independent
of current size, because of CRS in production. Therefore, the initial ranking of sizes by
productivity is preserved throughout, and values oﬀered to workers remain ranked by ﬁrm
productivity at all points in the future. This condition is only suﬃcient. We conjecture that
it is not necessary. It aligns two separate motives to pay workers more, ﬁrm productivity
and size, so clearly there is some slack. If ﬁrms are equally productive and only diﬀer in their
initial size, then only the size motive operates and all equilibria are RP, with no additional
conditions.
We stress that this is a characterization result, which neither establishes nor requires
existence, let alone uniqueness, of a RPE. Our main result says that, if a Markov Perfect
Equilibrium V exists, then V can only be a best response to itself if it is increasing in θ,
including the eﬀect of endogenous size on the posted value. So ours is a general monotonicity
result, which does not require to either propose or calculate a particular value-oﬀer strategy.
In the next section, we show by construction existence and uniqueness of a RPE, which must
then be the unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the contract-posting game.
To characterize a RPE we need to describe how allocation and prices depend on exogenous
states. The allocation is easy because constrained eﬃcient. We already know from Section
5In a way similar to that in which Caputo (2003) appeals to single-crossing properties of the Hamiltonian
in his analysis of comparative dynamics for deterministic optimal control problems.
173 how the size of each ﬁrm evolves in equilibrium. Indeed, the same logic applies to any job
ladder model in which a similar concept of RPE can be deﬁned. Nothing in the dynamics of
L? or Λ? depends on the particulars of the wage setting mechanism, so long as this is such
that employed jobseekers move from lower-ranking into higher-ranking jobs in the sense of a
time-invariant ranking. Therefore, this model’s predictions about everything relating to ﬁrm
sizes are in fact much more general than the wage- (or value-) posting assumption retained
in the BM model. We now turn to supporting prices.
5.5 Properties of optimal contracts in RPE
Equation (3) combined with the assumption that initial ﬁrm size, L0 (θ), is a continuous
function of θ (see Section 2) ensures that L? (θ) is a continuous function of θ at all dates in
a RPE. With that in mind, we can establish the following additional properties of the joint
value function S and worker value function V in a RPE:
Proposition 3 (Diﬀerentiability of value functions in RPE) The following properties
hold in a RPE:
1. L 7→ S (θ,L,ω,Λ?) is convex in L and diﬀerentiable in L at L? (θ), i.e. SL (θ,L? (θ),ω,Λ?)
exists for all θ. Moreover, SL (θ,L,ω,Λ?) is continuous in L at L? (θ);
2. θ 7→ SL (θ,L? (θ),ω,Λ?) is continuously diﬀerentiable in θ;
3. θ 7→ V (θ,L? (θ),ω,Λ?) is continuously diﬀerentiable in θ.
The proof is in Appendix B. While most of that proof is essentially technical, it begins by
establishing continuity of θ 7→ V (θ,L? (θ),ω,Λ?), which is intuitive by a simple improvement
argument. If V jumps up at some value of θ, the right and left limits of this value at θ generate
the same transitions and ﬁrm size, but the right limit costs the ﬁrm more, and revenues are
continuous in θ.
The third statement in Proposition 3 allows us to diﬀerentiate (15) and (16) w.r.t. θ:
f (V | ω,Λ
?) ·
dV
dθ
= γ (θ) and g (V | ω,Λ
?) ·
dV
dθ
= L
? (θ)γ (θ). (17)
at V = V (θ,L? (θ),ω,Λ?).
These diﬀerentiability properties allow the use in (14) of ﬁrst-order conditions, which,
for each state ω0, write down as (using the deﬁnition of L (·) again and using subscripts to
18denote partial derivatives):
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where mω0 is the Lagrange multiplier for the workers’ participation constraint W (ω0) ≥
U (ω0,T (ω0,Λ?)), and where complementary slackness mω0 [W (ω0) − U (ω0,T (ω0,Λ?))] = 0
applies. In a RPE, (18) is solved by W = V (θ,L? (θ),ω,Λ?). Next, in the ﬁrm’s problem
(14), the Envelope condition w.r.t. ﬁrm size writes as:
SL (θ,L
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(19)
5.6 Existence and uniqueness of (Rank-Preserving) equilibrium
We now introduce a time index t again. With a slight notational abuse, we denote:
Vt+1 (θ | ω) := V (θ,L
?
t (θ),ω,Λ
?
t) and Ut (ω) := U (ω,Λ
?
t).
We further deﬁne the costate variable:
µt+1 (θ | ω) := SL (θ,L (L
?
t (θ),ω,Λ
?
t,Vt+1 (θ | ω)),ω,T (ω,Λ
?
t)),
which measures the shadow value to the worker-ﬁrm collective of the marginal worker, given
the aggregate state, along the equilibrium path. Note that the dependence of V and µ on
the state variables L? and Λ? is subsumed into the time index in the above notation, which
is licit as those two variables evolve deterministically conditional on ω. Combining (18) and
the various restrictions (15), (16), and (17) that hold in a RPE, we obtain the RPE version
of the FOC (18):
λ
ω
0ut+λ
ω
1 (1 − δ
ω)Λ
?
t (θ)
= λ
ω
1 (1 − δ
ω)[µt+1 − Vt+1][L
?
t (θ)f (Vt+1 | ω,Λ
?
t) + (1 − u
?
t)g (Vt+1 | ω,Λ
?
t)] − m
ω
t
= 2λ
ω
1 (1 − δ
ω)
L?
t (θ)γ (θ)
dVt+1/dθ
(µt+1 − Vt+1) − m
ω
t , (20)
19and the RPE version of the Euler equation (19):
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ω0´
λ
ω0
1
Z +∞
θ
Vt+1 (x | ω
0)dΓ(x)
+ µt+1 (θ | ω
0)
³
1 − δ
ω0´³
1 − λ
ω0
1 Γ(θ)
´
)
H (dω
0 | ω), (21)
Note that now the shadow marginal value µ only depends on the distribution of employment
Λ? through total employment in all ﬁrms of productivity up to θ, Λ? (θ) and the corresponding
density L? (θ)γ (θ). Both are scalars, and the state reduces from b ζ = (θ,L,ω0,Λ), which is
inﬁnite-dimensional due to the relevance of the entire ﬁrm size distribution Λ, to the four-
dimensional vector z = (θ,L,ω0,Λ(θ)): in order to make its decisions, the ﬁrm only needs
to know the mass of employment at less productive ﬁrms Λ(θ) and not the entire size
distribution Λ.
Finally, a Transversality Condition (TVC) requires that the discounted joint marginal
value of adding one worker to the ﬁrm vanishes in expectation w.r. to the stochastic path
of ω
lim
t→∞
E
£
β
tµt (θ | ω)L
?
t (θ) | z0
¤
= 0. (22)
We now assume that ωθ ≥ bω ≥ 0 for all ω, so that U ≥ 0, because a worker has always the
option of staying unemployed to collect bω ≥ 0. We also assume that λω
0 −λω
1 is small enough
for every ω that the worker participation constraint never binds in equilibrium.6 A RPE is
then a value V increasing in θ, a shadow value of employment µ, and a value of unemployment
U positive and smaller than V , obeying the boundary condition Vt (θ | ω) = Ut (ω) and
solving the FOC (20), the Euler equation (21) and the unemployment Bellman equation (7)
given the RPE employment dynamics (1), subject to the TVC (22). Let
Qt (θ | ω) := (λ
ω
0ut + λ
ω
1 (1 − δ
ω)Λ
?
t (θ))
2 .
We can verify by direct substitution that the following value function satisﬁes the FOC (20)
and the boundary condition:
Vt (θ | ω) =
Qt (θ | ω)
Qt (θ | ω)
Ut (ω) +
Z θ
θ
µt (x | ω)
∂Qt
∂θ (x | ω)
Qt (θ | ω)
dx := TV [µt,Ut](θ | ω).
Let EΘ be the space of continuous cdf’s over Θ =
£
θ,θ
¤
, FΘ×Ω×E be the space of positive
functions Θ × Ω × EΘ → R2
+ such that the ﬁrst component is θ-integrable and the second
6Notice that when λ0 = λ1 the worker has no reason to decline any oﬀer, and with ωθ > bω even the least
productive ﬁrm can hire some unemployed workers and obtain positive proﬁts. We abstract from entry and
exit of ﬁrms to focus on the poaching competition and job ladder.
20component is constant as we vary θ ∈ Θ, and T =
¡Tµ
TU
¢
be the linear function on FΘ×Ω×E
deﬁned by
Tµ [µt,Ut](θ | ω) =
Z
Ω
(
δ
ω0
Ut+1 (ω
0) + µt+1 (θ | ω
0)
³
1 − δ
ω0´³
1 − λ
ω0
1 Γ(θ)
´
+
³
1 − δ
ω0´
λ
ω0
1
Z θ
θ
TV [µt+1,Ut+1](x | ω
0)dΓ(x)
)
H (dω
0 | ω)
TU [µt,Ut](ω) =
Z
Ω
(
³
1 − λ
ω0
0
´
Ut+1 (ω
0) + λ
ω0
0
Z θ
θ
TV [µt+1,Ut+1](x | ω
0)dΓ(x)
)
H (dω
0 | ω)
Note that by deﬁnition of these mappings, T preserves positivity of its arguments and the
second component is independent of θ, so that T maps FΘ×Ω×E into itself, whenever the
function is well deﬁned (the integrals exist).
Then a RPE is a solution
¡µ
U
¢
∈ FΘ×Ω×E of
µ
µ
U
¶
=
µ
ωθ
bω
¶
+ βT
µ
µ
U
¶
, (23)
which satisﬁes the TVC (22) and has 0 ≤ U ≤ TV [µ,U] ≤ µ and TV [µ,U] increasing in θ.
We are now in a position to prove the following result:
Proposition 4 (Uniqueness and Existence) There exists at most one equilibrium, which
is Rank-Preserving. If it exists, the optimal contract in this unique RPE is the wage policy
that pays the worker a value TV [µ?,U?] where:
µ
µ?
U?
¶
(θ | ω) := lim
n→∞
n X
j=0
β
jT
j
µ
ωθ
bω
¶
(θ | ω). (24)
Existence is guaranteed under the suﬃcient conditions ωθ ≥ bω and λω
0 ≤ λω
1 (1 − δω) ∀ ω.
The proof, in Appendix C, simply proceeds through forward substitution and induction, and
establishes also that this limit exists. While we have not been able to derive conditions on
parameters that are both necessary and suﬃcient for equilibrium existence (i.e. for (µ∗,U∗)
to be a RPE), this is not an issue in applications. In fact, we proved that there is only one
possible equilibrium set of contracts, that we can compute and then check ex post whether
in fact it satisﬁes all equilibrium conditions.
6 Practical implementation of RPE
6.1 A strategy to solve for stochastic RPE
We now show how to numerically “solve” for the RPE, by which we mean simulate the
dynamic paths of the distributions of employment and wages across ﬁrms, given an initial
21state and a subsequent realization of a sequence of aggregate shocks. Our main goal in
this ﬁnal section is to demonstrate that the conceptual simplicity of the model’s equilibrium
translates into computational tractability. This is important because it extends the scope of
the search and contract posting approach to aggregate labor market analysis. This class of
models have provided valuable insights into the causes of wage dispersion, worker turnover,
individual wage dynamics, and the ﬁrm size/wage relationship. So far, however, their appli-
cation to business cycle analysis has been considered an interesting but intractable problem.
To ﬁll this gap, we construct a numerical example based directly on the model of previous
sections. This example not only illustrates how to compute equilibrium, but also highlights
quantitative successes and failures of this simple version of the model. As we discuss in
the Conclusions, full quantitative success requires extending the model on a few dimensions,
in a way that we do now expect to overturn our main theoretical results. We leave a full
quantitative analysis for future research.
For the sake of illustration, we focus on the case where the aggregate state can take on
two values, Ω = {ω,ω0}, with conditional switching probabilities σω and σω0. The Euler
equation — or Envelope condition — (21) becomes:
µt (θ | ω) = ωθ + βσ
ω
(
δ
ω0
Ut+1 (ω
0) +
³
1 − δ
ω0´
λ
ω0
1
Z +∞
θ
Vt+1 (x | ω
0)dΓ(x)
+ µt+1 (θ | ω
0)
³
1 − δ
ω0´³
1 − λ
ω0
1 Γ(θ)
´
)
+ β (1 − σ
ω)
(
δ
ωUt+1 (ω) + (1 − δ
ω)λ
ω
1
Z +∞
θ
Vt+1 (x | ω)dΓ(x)
+ µt+1 (θ | ω)(1 − δ
ω)
¡
1 − λ
ω
1Γ(θ)
¢
)
.
Taking derivatives w.r. to θ on both sides, which is possible by Proposition 3:
∂µt
∂θ
(θ | ω) = ω + βσ
ω
³
1 − δ
ω0´½
λ
ω0
1 γ (θ)πt+1 (θ | ω
0) +
∂µt+1
∂θ
(θ | ω
0)
³
1 − λ
ω0
1 Γ(θ)
´¾
+ β (1 − σ
ω)(1 − δ
ω)
½
λ
ω
1γ (θ)πt+1 (θ | ω) +
∂µt+1
∂θ
(θ | ω)
¡
1 − λ
ω
1Γ(θ)
¢
¾
, (25)
where πt (θ | ω) := µt (θ | ω)−Vt (θ | ω) denotes the shadow value to the ﬁrm of the marginal
worker. Together with the FOC for an interior solution of the promised value:
∂πt+1
∂θ
(θ | ω) =
∂µt+1
∂θ
(θ | ω) −
2λω
1Λ?0
t (θ)(1 − δω)
λω
0ut + λω
1 (1 − δω)Λ?
t (θ)
πt+1 (θ | ω) (26)
this gives a system of four functional equations in πt (θ | ω), ∂µt (θ | ω)/∂θ, all functions of
θ and t, a pair for each value of ω.
22The main diﬃculty in solving this system lies in the dependence of ∂µt (θ | ω)/∂θ on
∂µt+1 (θ | ω0)/∂θ and πt+1 (θ | ω0), that is on the jump in the shadow marginal values of one
worker, both to the ﬁrm (π) and to the collective (µ), caused by the possible occurrence
of an aggregate state switch next period. To get around this problem, we can approxi-
mate that “jump term” by a known function J (e.g. polynomials) of the state variable
(θ,L? (θ),ω,Λ? (θ)) depending on a ﬁnite vector of unknown coeﬃcients, a, which can be
determined iteratively by successive approximations. Thus the proposed simulation protocol
is akin to a projection method to solve the system of PDEs that characterize equilibrium.
Its speciﬁc feature is that projection is only used to approximate the jumps in π and ∂µ/∂θ
caused by aggregate shocks, the rest of the system being solved “exactly”. Practical details
of the algorithm are given in Appendix D.
Simulation of the model then goes as follows: ﬁrst, we pick an initial state of the economy
(ω0,Λ0 (·),L0 (·)) and simulate a path of ω. Second, given the simulated path of ω and the
initial state of the economy, simulate the associated paths of Λ? (·) and L? (·) as per equations
(2) and (3). Third, given the previously simulated objects, we solve (25) and (26) subject
to (22) using the algorithm sketched above and described more completely in Appendix
D. Completion of those three steps produces a solution for {Λ?,L?,∂µt/∂θ,πt} over some
initially chosen time interval t ∈ {0,··· ,T} given any simulated sequence of aggregate states.
Wages are ﬁnally retrieved from:7
wt (θ | ω) = ωθ − πt (θ | ω) + βσ
ω
³
1 − δ
ω0´³
1 − λ
ω0
1 Γ(θ)
´
πt+1 (θ | ω
0)
+ β (1 − σ
ω)(1 − δ
ω)
¡
1 − λ
ω
1Γ(θ)
¢
πt+1 (θ | ω).
6.2 Calibration and Simulation Results
We now illustrate the quantitative properties of the model using the following calibration.
First, all scalar parameters are given values as indicated in Table 1. Next, the sampling
distribution of ﬁrm types is calibrated following the Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg
(2000) estimation procedure in such a way that the predicted steady-state distribution in
the high productivity state ﬁts the business sector wage distribution observed from the CPS
in 2006 (see MPV08 for details).
The aggregate productivity shifter ω is normalized to one in the low aggregate state and
assumed to be 1% higher in the high state, so that aggregate labor productivity will exhibit
ﬂuctuations of roughly ±3% around its trend (see Figure 3 below), which is in same order
7Note that this equation also features a “jump term” — i.e., wt (θ | ω) depends on future values of π in
both aggregate states. We approximate that jump term in the same fashion as we do the jump term in the
diﬀerentiated Euler equation (25).
23ω λω
0 λω
1 δω σω β
Expansion 1.01 0.206 0.25 · λω
0 0.011 0.0238 0.9959
Contraction 1 0.159 0.25 · λω
0 0.012 0.0238 0.9959
Table 1: Model Calibration
of magnitude as Robin’s (2009) estimates. The high-state value of λ0 is the monthly job
ﬁnding rate from the Current Population Survey, averaged over periods during which the
U.S. unemployment rate was below its HP trend since 1967. The low-state value of λ0 is
deﬁned in the same way, the average over periods of above-trend unemployment. The job
loss rate δ is also constructed in a similar fashion, using averages of the monthly rate of
separations out of employment.8 The arrival rate of oﬀers to employed job seekers, λ1, is
calibrated as a constant fraction of λ0 which produces a share of job-to-job transitions in
total separations of about 50%, as is typically observed (e.g. Hall, 2005). The aggregate
productivity process is calibrated in such a way that unemployment is below (resp. above)
trend half of the time, with the duration of an average period of below-trend (resp. above-
trend) unemployment equalling 3.5 years (as is the case for the monthly U.S. unemployment
rate on average since 1948). The discount factor β corresponds to an annual discount rate
of 5 percent.
We also simplify the model slightly for computational purposes by imposing a constant
binding minimum wage w, so that the lowest-θ ﬁrm in the market will always oﬀer a constant
wage of w. This binding minimum wage substitutes the more complex boundary condition
V (θ | ω) = U (ω) in the system characterizing equilibrium. Finally, we abstract from entry
or exit of ﬁrms over the cycle. In particular the lower bound of the support of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
productivity components, θ, is normalized at 1 in both aggregate productivity states, and
so is the minimum wage, w. This, together with low enough values of leisure bω in all states
to keep workers from ever wanting to quit into unemployment, implies that even the least
productive ﬁrm in the economy remains viable in bad times, so that aggregate downturns
do not cause ﬁrms to leave the market.
Figures 1-4 illustrate the output of a representative simulation. The economy’s initial
state is set to the low-ω steady state, and at time 0 is hit by a positive aggregate productivity
shock: the economy starts oﬀ in an expansionary phase, just out of a very (inﬁnitely) long
recession. The simulated series then cover a period of 30 years spanning several expansions
and recessions. On all plots the cycle is materialized by the dashed line which represents the
unemployment rate (in deviations from its mean and rescaled for legibility).
8The worker ﬂow data used for this calibration was constructed by Robert Shimer
(http://sites.google.com/site/robertshimer/research/flows).
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Fig. 1: Firm size growth rate diﬀerential (solid) and unemployment rate (dashed)
The results do not diﬀer qualitatively from those of the deterministic transition dynamics
analyzed in MPV08. Most remarkably, as documented in MPV08 and MPV09, the growth
rate diﬀerential of employment at (initially) large minus small ﬁrms collapses upon a reces-
sion and rises slowly through an expansion, as shown on Figure 1 which plots the simulated
diﬀerential in average growth rates across ﬁrm size classes.9 The cyclical pattern of relative
growth by ﬁrm size is naturally interpreted in our model as reﬂecting the slow upgrading
of workers to better jobs through on the job search. The governing mechanism is the fol-
lowing. At the onset of an expansion, the many unemployed workers inherited from the
previous recession are available for work at any (low) wage that makes work preferable to
unemployment. As those unemployed job applicants are willing to accept any oﬀer, the
random search process allocates them into ﬁrms following the sampling distribution of ﬁrm
types. However the magnitude of the job ﬁnding rate λ0 is such that the pool of cheap,
unemployed job seekers dries out quickly. To keep expanding, ﬁrms begin to raise wages to
poach labor from their competitors. But as argued earlier, the BM single-crossing argument
applies: more productive ﬁrms are both able and willing to raise wages further than their less
productive competitors, as their opportunity cost of not producing is higher, especially so
9Formally, the average growth rate diﬀerential is deﬁned as:
Λ
?
t+1(θ)−Λ
?
t+1(θ`)
Λ?
t(θ)−Λ?
t(θ`) −
Λ
?
t+1(θs)
Λ?
t(θs), where θ` and θs
are thresholds deﬁning the groups of “large” and “small” ﬁrms, respectively. Here the group of large ﬁrms
is deﬁned as the top tercile of the (high-) steady-state distribution of ﬁrm sizes among workers, while small
ﬁrms are the bottom tercile of that distribution. According to data on the distribution of ﬁrm sizes from
the Business Dynamics Statistics those thresholds roughly correspond to ﬁrms of over 1000 and less than 50
employees, respectively, which are the thresholds used in MPV09.
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Fig. 2: Job-to-job transition rate (solid) and unemployment rate (dashed)
in an aggregate expansion. Thus workers gradually select themselves into more productive,
better paying jobs — at the speed permitted by search frictions, which is determined by λ1
— and more productive ﬁrms grow relatively faster and become relatively larger.10 As a
consequence, as the expansion progresses, the distribution of employment becomes increas-
ingly skewed toward more productive, larger ﬁrms. Therefore, when the recession hits, while
all ﬁrms have too many workers, larger ﬁrms have relatively more excess employment. The
distribution of ﬁrm sizes must then ebb back toward smaller ﬁrms, so in net terms large
ﬁrms shed proportionally more workers to reduce their share. Finally, note that the same
intuition explains the negative correlation between the rates of unemployment and job-to-job
transition predicted by our model (Figure 2).
The cyclical upgrading of workers also strongly propagates and ampliﬁes the eﬀects of
the aggregate labor productivity shock on measured average labor productivity (Figure 3).
Labor being a quasi-ﬁxed factor in this model, average output per worker jumps upon im-
pact of an aggregate, proportional productivity shock by ±1%, the calibrated magnitude of
the aggregate shock (see Table 1). After that initial jump, output per worker continues to
adjust in the direction of the shock in a smooth and quasi-monotonic fashion. This smooth
adjustment is driven by the slow movements of workers up and down the job ladder: for
example in an expansion, labor is slowly reallocated toward more productive ﬁrms, which
10Indeed an immediate implication of the RP property of equilibrium is that a ﬁrm’s rank in the distribution
of ﬁrm sizes is the same as that ﬁrm’s rank in the productivity distribution or in the distribution of oﬀered
worker values. As such our model provides a theoretical justiﬁcation for the use of ﬁrm size as a proxy for
ﬁrm productivity — as does any job-ladder model whose equilibrium has the RP property.
260 5 10 15 20 25 30
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
Fig. 3: Mean output per worker (solid) and unemployment rate (dashed)
increases average labor productivity beyond the initial increase in the aggregate productivity
shifter through a composition eﬀect. Moreover, because the driving force is the reallocation
of workers into better jobs, the speed at which that composition eﬀect drives average pro-
ductivity up is limited by the speed at which employed workers are able to ﬁnd better jobs,
before they lose the ones they have. So the key parameter that determines the extent of
propagation of aggregate shocks in this model is the ratio λ1/δ, a standard measure of the
extent of search frictions in wage-posting models.11
The model predicts procyclical wages in the sense that on average steady-state wages
are lower in the low aggregate state than in the high aggregate state. We also observe that
the wage jumps in a direction opposite to labor productivity when aggregate shocks hit.
For example, due to wage backloading, wages drop on impact following a positive aggregate
shock. These jumps, however, are largely a consequence of the oversimpliﬁed, two-point
productivity process that we adopted for illustrative purposes, and are likely to disappear
with a smoother productivity process. The forces combining into the observed dynamic path
of wages are the following. First, the composition eﬀect described in the previous paragraph
11Figure 3 also shows a slight dip in average labor productivity at the beginning of some of the expansions,
immediately after the initial jump directly caused by the shock. This dip is also due to a composition
eﬀect: as argued before, at early stages of an expansion, when the unemployed are many, new hires get
allocated disproportionately into low-productivity ﬁrms, which tends to bring down aggregate productivity.
If λ0 (which governs the inﬂow of unemployed job applicants) is suﬃciently large, that eﬀect may initially
dominate the positive eﬀect of labor upgrading on mean output per worker. But then precisely because λ0
is large, the pool of unemployed job applicants becomes depleted very quickly, so that the eﬀect described
in this footnote is short-lived.
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Fig. 4: Mean wage (in log, solid) and unemployment rate (dashed)
as governing the smooth dynamics of productivity also aﬀects wages: more productive ﬁrms
pay higher wages at all dates and workers move up the productivity (or wage) ladder in
expansions and down that ladder in recessions. In addition, each ﬁrm-level wage also follows
a dynamic path of its own. The fact mentioned in the discussion of Proposition 2 that larger
ﬁrms have a motive to transfer higher values to their workers also applies across dates for a
given ﬁrm: ﬁrms tend to post higher values whenever they grow in size, and vice versa.
7 Conclusion
This paper is the ﬁrst to characterize stochastic equilibrium of an economy where the Law of
One Price fails due to random search frictions and monopsony power, a problem that was long
held to be intractable. Speciﬁcally, we introduce aggregate productivity shocks in a wage-
posting model a la Burdett and Mortensen (1998), and we allow for rich state-contingent
employment contracts. By extending the theory of Monotone Comparative Statics to a
Dynamic Programming environment, we establish that, under mild suﬃcient conditions, the
equilibrium is unique, constrained eﬃcient, and very tractable, and we provide an algorithm
to compute it. We show that the equilibrium stochastic dynamics of this model economy
exhibit qualitative properties that are in line with the new business cycle facts illustrated
in MPV09 and MPV10, most notably, that small ﬁrms as a group have relative less cyclical
employment and returns to capital than large ﬁrms.
To conclude, we revisit some of our assumptions, both to explore the robustness of our
28theoretical results, which are the main focus of this paper, and to prepare the ground for
future research on extensions of the model, with an eye also to improve its quantitative
performance at business cycle frequencies.
We ﬁrst observe that the unique RPE and constrained eﬃcient allocation of employment
is also the unique equilibrium allocation of more restricted contract-posting games. For
example, suppose ﬁrms can post wages that are conditioned on aggregate productivity ω
and own productivity θ, but not on own size L or employment distribution Λ because, say,
L is too diﬃcult to verify for the worker, and Λ is too diﬃcult to measure for either the
worker or the ﬁrm. Proposition 2 shows that a ﬁrm’s best response to any strategy adopted
by other ﬁrms is increasing in θ as long as it can be conditioned on the aggregate state ω.
Therefore, this game in restricted contracts must also have a unique equilibrium which is
RP. Constrained eﬃcient reallocation can be implemented in relatively simple strategies that
only depend on θ and ω.
The assumption of commitment to state-contingent wages is typically binding, as ﬁrms
would like to renege on their promises once workers are hired. This assumption is standard
in the literature, where it is well understood that commitment may both be beneﬁcial to the
ﬁrm and sustainable in long term employment relationships. Nonetheless, this assumption
could be relaxed in many diﬀerent ways. For example, the ﬁrm may be allowed a choice
of whether or not commit to a speciﬁc strategy (as in Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2004). Or,
it may only be committed to end-of-current-period payments with or (as in Coles, 2001)
without an equal-treatment constraint. Then, a ﬁrm may choose to deliver value to its
workers upon hiring them and then squeeze them against the participation constraint. Under
the equal-treatment constraint, this strategy would not poach any workers. Without the
constraint, this strategy of extremely front-loaded payments (pure sign-up bonus) has the
cost of accelerating turnover. It is then plausible that an individual ﬁrm may not want to play
this strategy if no other ﬁrm does, but rather choose to backload wages sequentially, even
without commitment, due to the need to retain workers once hired. This is an interesting
avenue for future research.
We have treated job-contact and job-destruction probabilities as exogenous, albeit state-
dependent, objects. More natural and common is to endogenize them through a matching
function and possibly idiosyncratic productivity shocks. On the ﬁrst count, we envision
the following natural extension of the model. A ﬁrm can post vacancies, or spend hiring
eﬀort, at a convex cost. Own vacancies determine the ﬁrm’s sampling weight in workers’
job search. The ﬁrm now has two tools at its disposal to recruit workers, promised contract
value and vacancies (hiring eﬀort). We expect the dynamic single-crossing property that
we uncover in the value function of the optimal contract-posting problem to imply that not
29only the value oﬀered to the worker, but also the intensity of hiring eﬀort, increase with ﬁrm
productivity and size. This result would only reinforce the mechanism that we highlight and
which gives rise to the unique Rank-Preserving equilibrium. Quantitatively, it would greatly
help to explain the empirical inequality in ﬁrm sizes based on labor turnover frictions alone.
On the time domain, in order for large ﬁrms to exhibit more cyclical job creation rates in
equilibrium, they would have to post in equilibrium a measure of vacancies that is procyclical
relative to those of small ﬁrms.
We are aware that multiple factors, beyond just employment frictions, contribute to
determine the size of a ﬁrm, most notably adjustment costs to other factors, such as capital
adjustment costs and ﬁnancial frictions, and diminishing marginal revenues from hiring,
due to either technology (decreasing returns to labor due to another ﬁxed factor), span of
control frictions, or price-making power. Diminishing returns in wage-posting models have
been partially explored in a steady state context, and can invalidate some of the equilibrium
properties, such as the absence of atoms in the oﬀer distribution. We cannot identify, though,
obvious reasons why they would overturn the main result that equilibrium must be Rank-
Preserving. It seems inconsistent with equilibrium logic that a more productive ﬁrm may
decide to hire so many more workers as to drive its marginal revenue of labor strictly below
that of a less productive ﬁrm, thus breaking the RP property.
We have treated ﬁrm productivity as a ﬁxed, time-invariant parameter. Empirical evi-
dence shows that revenue-based measures of ﬁrm productivity are subject to shocks, which
determine entry, exit and a ﬁrm’s life cycle. Shocks to ﬁrm productivity create obvious issues
for Rank-Preserving equilibria, as a very large and productive ﬁrm may suddenly become
unproductive, and then face contrasting incentives to oﬀer its employees a high value, its
sheer size and retention needs against low productivity. The relevant question, however, is
how variable is a typical ﬁrm’s productivity at business cycle frequencies. The scant empir-
ical evidence in this regard, limited to the manufacturing sector, (Haltiwanger et al., 2008,
Table 3) suggests that establishment-level TFP calculated from physical output data is very
persistent, about as much as aggregate TFP. MPV09 show with data from several countries
that several correlated features of a ﬁrm, such as its size, the average wages it pays, and its
revenue-based productivity, when measured at one point in time strongly predict how job
creation by the same ﬁrm responds to business cycle shocks that hit it over two decades later.
This striking phenomenon suggests that our assumption of ﬁxed ﬁrm productivity might be
a reasonable approximation for our purposes.
Finally, our numerical example illustrates the practicality of these model economies as
tools for business cycle analysis, and can also claim some success at matching old and new
facts about aggregate labor markets, both cross-sectional and on the time domain. We believe
30that the slow propagation of aggregate shocks, as manifest in the sluggish response of average
labor productivity and wages in our model, due to the slow upgrading of labor through job
to job quits, is an important feature of actual business cycles which is missing altogether
from existing quantitative business cycle models. The model extensions mentioned above, as
well as possibly others, are bound to help to further improve the quantitative performance
of the model. Overall, the results of this paper unlock an exciting research program.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2
For convenience, we repeat the ﬁrm’s DP problem (14):
S (θ,L,ω,Λ) = ωθL + β
Z
Ω
(
δ
ω0
U (ω
0,T (ω
0,Λ))L
+ sup
W(ω0)≥U(ω0,T (ω0,Λ))
*
S (θ,L (L,ω
0,Λ,W (ω
0)),ω
0,T (ω
0,Λ))+L
³
1 − δ
ω0´
λ
ω0
1
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W(ω0)
vdF (v | ω
0,Λ)
− W (ω
0)
³
λ
ω0
0
¡
1 − Λ
¡
θ
¢¢
+ λ
ω0
1
³
1 − δ
ω0´
Λ
¡
θ
¢
G(W (ω
0) | ω
0,Λ)
´
+)
H (dω
0 | ω),
and the claim: if this problem has a solution, then any measurable selection V (θ,L,ω,Λ)
from the optimal correspondence is such that V (θ,L∗ (θ),ω,Λ) is increasing in θ. We intro-
duce the following notation:
A(θ,L,ω,Λ) := ωθL + β
Z
Ω
δ
ω0
U (ω
0,T (ω
0,Λ))LH (dω
0 | ω),
B (L,ω
0,Λ;W (ω
0)) := L
³
1 − δ
ω0´
λ
ω0
1
Z +∞
W(ω0)
vdF (v | ω
0,Λ)
− W (ω
0)
³
λ
ω0
0
¡
1 − Λ
¡
θ
¢¢
+ λ
ω0
1
³
1 − δ
ω0´
Λ
¡
θ
¢
G(W (ω
0) | ω
0,Λ)
´
.
Our proof strategy is as follows. First, we deﬁne certain supermodularity properties SM
of a value function that imply that the maximizer V in (14) is increasing in θ. Then, we
ﬁx an arbitrary Λ and show that the Bellman operator in (14) for the restricted problem
with ﬁxed Λ is a contraction mapping from the space of SM functions into itself, and that
this space is Banach and closed under the sup norm. Therefore, for any ﬁxed Λ (14) has
a unique solution. Finally, if there exists a solution S to (14) when Λ is not ﬁxed, then S
must also solve the restricted problem (14) for any ﬁxed Λ. By uniqueness and SM of the
33solution to the restricted problem any solution to the unrestricted problem must also have
the SM properties. We cannot extend the same logic to show existence of S with variable Λ
because Blackwell’s suﬃcient conditions for a contraction mapping apply only to functions
over Rn.
So ﬁx Λ to be some given CDF over
£
θ,θ
¤
. Then, for any function S (θ,L,ω), we deﬁne
the following operator MΛ:
M
ΛS (θ,L,ω) := A(θ,L,ω,Λ)
+ β
Z
Ω
max
W(ω0)
D
S [θ,L (L,ω
0,Λ,W (ω
0)),ω
0] + B (L,ω
0,Λ;W (ω
0))
E
H (dω
0 | ω). (27)
The following additional consideration simpliﬁes the proof: the worker participation con-
straint W ≥ U can be ignored in the proof. To see why, observe the following. Once we
establish that an interior solution is increasing in θ, we can conclude that any set of ﬁrms that
oﬀers a corner solution W = U and shuts down must be the set of the least productive ﬁrms.
But then, the global solution, including the corner, is weakly increasing in θ as claimed.
Incidentally, if all ﬁrms oﬀered U, from the previous reasoning (and barring the trivial case
where all ﬁrms are too unproductive to operate) the most productive ﬁrms would deviate
and proﬁtably oﬀer more, so there exist always some ﬁrms that have an interior solution
where PC does not bind.
Lemma 1 Let S (θ,L,ω) be bounded, continuous in θ and L, increasing and convex in L
and with increasing diﬀerences in (θ,L) over
¡
θ,θ
¢
× (0,1). Then:
1. MΛS is bounded and continuous in θ and L;
2. There exists a measurable selection V (θ,L,ω,Λ) from the maximizing correspondence
associated with MΛS;
3. Any such measurable selection V is increasing in θ and L;
4. MΛS is increasing and convex in L and with increasing diﬀerences in (θ,L) over
¡
θ,θ
¢
× (0,1).
Proof. In this proof, wherever possible without causing confusion, we will make
the dependence of all functions on aggregate state variables ω and Λ implicit to
streamline the notation.
Points 1 and 2 of this lemma are immediate: continuity of MΛS is a direct
consequence of Berge’s Theorem. Boundedness of MΛS is obvious by construc-
tion. Existence of a measurable selection from the maximizing correspondence
34associated with MΛS is a direct consequence of the Measurable Selection The-
orem.
To prove point 3, we ﬁrst establish that the maximand in (27) has increas-
ing diﬀerences in (θ,W) and (L,W). Monotonicity of V in θ and L will then
follow from standard monotone comparative statics arguments. Proving that
the maximand in (27) has increasing diﬀerences in (θ,W) is immediate as B
is independent of θ: letting τ > 0, diﬀerences in θ of the maximand equal
S (θ + τ,L (L,W)) − S (θ,L (L,W)) which is increasing in W because L
is increasing in W by construction and S has increasing diﬀerences in (θ,L) by
assumption. We thus now ﬁx θ and focus on establishing that the maximand in
(27) has increasing diﬀerences in (L,W). To this end, ﬁrst note that, since S
is assumed to be continuous and convex in L, it has left and right derivatives
everywhere (and those two can at most diﬀer at countably many points). Now
take L and h > 0 and deﬁne the diﬀerence in L of the maximand in (27):
D (W) := S (θ,L (L + h,W)) − S (θ,L (L,W))
+ h
³
1 − δ
ω0´
λ
ω0
1
Z +∞
W
vdF (v | ω
0).
(The dependence of D on θ is kept implicit.) We want to establish that D (W) is
increasing in W. We do not know whether F and G, thus D, are diﬀerentiable,
so we proceed by showing that the upper-right Dini derivative of D (W), which
we denote as D+D (W) and which exists everywhere (although possibly equalling
±∞), is everywhere positive. Take x > 0:
D (W + x) − D (W)
= S (θ,L (L + h,W + x)) − S (θ,L (L,W + x))
− [S (θ,L (L + h,W)) − S (θ,L (L,W))]
− h
³
1 − δ
ω0´
λ
ω0
1
Z W+x
W
vdF (v | ω
0)
= {SL,r (θ,L (L + h,W)) + ε1 [L (L + h,W + x) − L (L + h,W)]}
× {L (L + h,W + x) − L (L + h,W)}
− {SL,r (θ,L (L,W)) + ε2 [L (L,W + x) − L (L,W)]}
× {L (L,W + x) − L (L,W)}
− h
³
1 − δ
ω0´
λ
ω0
1
Z W+x
W
vdF (v | ω
0)
where ε1 and ε2 are functions that have limit 0 at 0, fx,` [fx,r] is used to designate
35the left [right] partial derivative of any function f w.r.t. x, and MΛS has one-
sided derivatives because it is convex. Majorizing the last integral:
D (W + x) − D (W)
≥ {SL,r (θ,L (L + h,W)) + ε1 [L (L + h,W + x) − L (L + h,W)]}
× {L (L + h,W + x) − L (L + h,W)}
− {SL,r (θ,L (L,W)) + ε2 [L (L,W + x) − L (L,W)]}
× {L (L,W + x) − L (L,W)}
− h
³
1 − δ
ω0´
λ
ω0
1 (W + x)[F (W + x | ω
0) − F (W | ω
0)].
Dividing through by x and taking the limit superior as x → 0+ (using the deﬁ-
nition of L, the fact that SL,r ≥ 0 by assumption, continuity of F and G, and
some basic properties of Dini derivatives), we obtain:
D
+D (W) ≥
SL,r (θ,L (L + h,W)) · λ
ω0
1
³
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1 WD+F (W),
where, in standard fashion, D+F denotes the lower-right Dini derivative of F
(and likewise for G). Because F and G are increasing, their Dini derivatives are
such that D+F ≥ D+F ≥ 0 (and likewise for G). Because S is convex in L by
assumption, SL,r is increasing in L. Combining all those properties, the latter
inequality implies:
D
+D (W) ≥ [SL,r (θ,L (L,W)) − W] ·
³
1 − δ
ω0´
λ
ω0
1 hD+F (W). (28)
The only way the RHS in this last inequality can be negative is if SL,r (θ,L (L,W))−
W < 0. We now show that this cannot be if W is an optimal selection. Let V
be an optimal selection and let x > 0. Optimality requires that:
0 ≥ S (θ,L (L,V − x)) + L
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36Collecting terms and again majorizing the integral term as we did for D:
0 ≥ {SL,` (θ,L (L,V )) + ε[L (L,V − x) − L (L,V )]}·{L (L,V − x) − L (L,V )}
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Now again taking the limit superior as x → 0+ (in what follows D−F and D−F
designate the upper and lower left Dini derivative of F, respectively, and likewise
for G):12
0 ≥ −SL,` (θ,L (L,V )) · λ
ω0
1
³
1 − δ
ω0´©
LD−F (V ) + Λ
¡
θ
¢
D−G(V )
ª
+ V λ
ω0
1
³
1 − δ
ω0´©
LD
−F (V ) + Λ
¡
θ
¢
D
−G(V )
ª
+ λ
ω0
0
¡
1 − Λ
¡
θ
¢¢
+ λ
ω0
1
³
1 − δ
ω0´
Λ
¡
θ
¢
G(V | ω
0).
Finally recalling that D−F ≥ D−F ≥ 0 (and likewise for G), the latter inequality
implies:
SL,` (θ,L (L,V )) − V ≥
λω0
0
¡
1 − Λ
¡
θ
¢¢
+ λω0
1
¡
1 − δω0¢
Λ
¡
θ
¢
G(V | ω0)
λω0
1 (1 − δω0)
©
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θ
¢
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(29)
This, together with (28), shows that D+D (V ) ≥ 0 at all V which is an optimal
selection, i.e. at all V in the support of F. To ﬁnally establish that D is increasing
over the support of F, recall that, as F and G are continuous by Proposition 1,
so is W 7→ L (L,W). Moreover, as S is convex in L (by assumption), it is
continuous w.r.t. L. Thus by inspection, D is a continuous function of W.
Continuity plus the fact that D+D (V ) ≥ 0 are suﬃcient to ensure that D is
strictly increasing (see, e.g., Proposition 2 p99 in Royden, 1988). Point 3 of the
lemma is thus proven.
Now on to point 4. Take (θ0,L0) ∈
¡
θ,θ
¢
× (0,1) and h > 0 such that
(θ0 + h,L0 + h) are still in
¡
θ,θ
¢
×(0,1). We ﬁrst consider right-diﬀerentiability
of MΛS w.r.t. L at L0. Again ﬁxing an arbitrary selection V from the op-
timal policy correspondence, we note that, while V may have a discontinuity
at (θ0,L0), the fact that it is increasing in L ensures that V
¡
θ0,L
+
0 ,ω0¢
:=
12This uses the facts that SL,` ≥ 0, that F and G are continuous, and that D− [−f] = −D−f for any
function f.
37limh→0+ V (θ0,L0 + h,ω0) exists everywhere (and likewise for V
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point 3, V
¡
θ0,L
+
0 ,ω0¢
is increasing in L0. Then:
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where the last equality follows from the deﬁnitions of A and B. Then again:
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Now dividing through by h in (30) and (31), and invoking continuity w.r.t. V
of LL (L,V ) =
¡
1 − δω0¢¡
1 − λω0
1 F (V )
¢
(by continuity of F), everywhere right-
diﬀerentiability of S w.r.t. L (by convexity of S), and existence of a right limit
38of V at any L0 (by monotonicity of V established in point 1 of this lemma), we
see that the lower and upper bounds of 1
h
£
MΛS (θ0,L0 + h) − MΛS
¡
θ0,L
+
0
¢¤
exhibited in (30) and (31) both converge to the same limit as h → 0+, which,
together with continuity of MΛS in L at L0 which implies MΛS
¡
θ0,L
+
0
¢
=
MΛS (θ0,L0), establishes right-diﬀerentiability of MΛS w.r.t L with the fol-
lowing expression for
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Straightforward inspection shows that
£
MΛS
¤
L,r (θ,L) > 0, so that MΛS is
increasing in L. We now show that
£
MΛS
¤
L,r (θ,L) is increasing in L and θ. It
is suﬃcient to show that the term under the
R
in (32) is increasing in L and θ
for all ω0 ∈ Ω. We begin with L. Let L1 < L2 ∈ [0,1]
2. To lighten the notation,
let Vk = V
¡
θ,L
+
k ,ω0¢
for k = 1,2. Because V is increasing in L, V2 ≥ V1. Then:
SL,r [θ,L (L2,V2)] · LL (L2,V2) − SL,r [θ,L (L1,V1)] · LL (L1,V1)
−
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0),
where the last equality stems from the deﬁnition of LL. Because SL,r and L
are both increasing in L, and because L is also increasing in V , the ﬁrst term
in the r.h.s. of the last equality above is positive. Finally, convexity of S
combined with the ﬁrst-order condition (29) implies that SL,r [θ,L (L2,V2)] ≥
SL,` [θ,L (L2,V2)] ≥ V2, so that SL,r [θ,L (L2,V2)] ≥ v for all v ≤ V2, implying
that the integral term is nonnegative. This shows that
£
MΛS
¤
L,r is (strictly)
increasing in L. The proof that
£
MΛS
¤
L,r is strictly increasing in θ proceeds
39along similar lines (details available upon request). Thus MΛS is a continuous
function whose right partial derivative w.r.t. L exists everywhere, is increasing
in L — which proves convexity w.r.t. L —, and increasing in θ — which proves
increasing diﬀerences in (θ,L). ¤
Now consider the set of functions deﬁned over
£
θ,θ
¤
×[0,1]×Ω that are continuous in (θ,L)
and call it C[θ,θ]×[0,1]×Ω. That set is a Banach space when endowed with the sup norm. As
Lemma 1 suggests we will be interested in the properties a subset C0
[θ,θ]×[0,1]×Ω ⊂ C[θ,θ]×[0,1]×Ω
of functions that are increasing and convex in L and have increasing diﬀerences in (θ,L).
We next prove two ancillary lemmas, which will establish as a corollary (Corollary 1) that
C0
[θ,θ]×[0,1]×Ω is closed in C[θ,θ]×[0,1]×Ω under the sup norm.13
Lemma 2 Let X be an interval in R and fn : X → R, N ∈ N such that {fn} converges
uniformly to f. Then:
1. if fn is nondecreasing for all n, so is f;
2. if fn is convex for all n, so is f.
Proof. For point 1, take (x1,x2) ∈ X2 such that x2 > x1. Fix k ∈ N. By
uniform convergence, ∃nk ∈ N : ∀n ≥ nk, ∀x ∈ X, |fn (x) − f (x)| < 1
2k. Then:
f (x2)−f (x1) = f (x2) − fnk (x2)
| {z }
>−1/2k
+ fnk (x2) − fnk (x1)
| {z }
≥0 by monotonicity of fnk
+fnk (x1) − f (x1)
| {z }
>−1/2k
> −
1
k
.
As the above is valid for an arbitrary choice of k ∈ N and (x1,x2) ∈ X2, it
establishes that f is nondecreasing. For point 2, uniform convergence of {fn}
to f implies pointwise convergence, so that Theorem 6.2.35 p282 in Corbae,
Stinchcombe and Zeman (2009) can be applied. ¤
Lemma 3 Let X ⊂ R2 be a convex set and fn : X → R, N ∈ N be functions with increasing
diﬀerences such that {fn} converges uniformly to f. Then f has increasing diﬀerences.
Proof. Let {(x1,y1),(x2,y2)} ∈ X2 such that x2 > x1 and y2 > y1. Fix k ∈ N.
By uniform convergence, ∃nk ∈ N : ∀n ≥ nk, ∀(x,y) ∈ X, |fn (x,y) − f (x,y)| <
13While for the purposes of this proof (which is concerned with closedness under the sup norm) both
lemmas are stated for sequences that converge uniformly, it is straightforward to extend them to the case of
pointwise convergent sequences.
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4k. Then:
f (x2,y2) − f (x1,y2)
= f (x2,y2) − fnk (x2,y2)
| {z }
>−1/4k
+ fnk (x2,y2) − fnk (x1,y2)
| {z }
>fnk(x2,y1)−fnk(x1,y1) by ID of fnk
+fnk (x1,y2) − f (x1,y2)
| {z }
>−1/4k
> −
1
2k
+ fnk (x2,y1) − fnk (x1,y1)
= −
1
2k
+ fnk (x2,y1) − f (x2,y1)
| {z }
>−1/4k
+f (x2,y1) − f (x1,y1) + f (x1,y1) − fnk (x1,y1)
| {z }
>−1/4k
> −
1
k
+ f (x2,y1) − f (x1,y1).
As the above is valid for an arbitrary choice of k ∈ N and {(x1,y1),(x2,y2)} ∈ X2,
it establishes that f has increasing diﬀerences. ¤
Corollary 1 The set C0
[θ,θ]×[0,1]×Ω of functions deﬁned over
£
θ,θ
¤
×[0,1]×Ω that are increas-
ing and convex in L and have increasing diﬀerences in (θ,L) is a closed subset of C[θ,θ]×[0,1]×Ω
under the sup norm.
The latter corollary establishes that, given a ﬁxed Λ, the set of functions that are relevant
to Lemma 1 is a closed subset of a Banach space of functions under the sup norm. The
following lemma shows that the operator considered in Lemma 1 is a contraction under that
same norm.
Lemma 4 The operator MΛ deﬁned in (27) maps C0
[θ,θ]×[0,1]×Ω into itself and is a contrac-
tion of modulus β under the sup norm.
Proof. That MΛ maps C0
[θ,θ]×[0,1]×Ω into itself ﬂows directly from a subset of
the proof of Lemma 1. To prove that M is a contraction, it is straightforward to
check using (27) that MΛ satisﬁes Blackwell’s suﬃcient conditions with modulus
β. ¤
We are now in a position to prove the proposition. Given the initially ﬁxed Λ, the operator
MΛ, which by Lemma 4 is a contraction from C[θ,θ]×[0,1]×Ω into itself, and has a unique ﬁxed
point SΛ in that set (by the Contraction Mapping Theorem). Moreover, since C0
[θ,θ]×[0,1]×Ω
is a closed subset of C[θ,θ]×[0,1]×Ω (Lemma 2) and since MΛ also maps C0
[θ,θ]×[0,1]×Ω into itself
(Lemma 1), that ﬁxed point SΛ belongs to C0
[θ,θ]×[0,1]×Ω.
Summing up, what we have established thus far is that for any ﬁxed Λ ∈ C[θ,θ], the
operator MΛ over functions of (θ,L,ω) has a unique, bounded and continuous ﬁxed point
S ?
Λ = MΛS ?
Λ ∈ C0
[θ,θ]×[0,1]×Ω ⊂ C[θ,θ]×[0,1]×Ω.
41We ﬁnally turn to the Bellman operator M which is relevant to the ﬁrm’s problem. That
operator M applies to functions S deﬁned on
£
θ,θ
¤
×[0,1]×Ω×C[θ,θ] and is deﬁned as the
following “extension” of MΛ:
MS (θ,L,ω,Λ) := A(θ,L,ω,Λ)
+ β
Z
Ω
max
W(ω0)
D
S [θ,L (L,ω
0,Λ,W (ω
0)),ω
0,T (ω,Λ)] + B (L,ω
0,Λ;W (ω
0))
E
H (dω
0 | ω).
If an equilibrium exists, then a ﬁrm has a best response and a value S which solves S = MS.
For every Λ ∈ C[θ,θ], by deﬁnition of M and MΛ this implies S = MΛS. Since the ﬁxed
point of MΛ is unique, if S = MS exists then for every ﬁxed Λ ∈ C[θ,θ] we have for all
(θ,L,ω) ∈
£
θ,θ
¤
× [0,1] × Ω: S (θ,L,ω,Λ) = S ?
Λ (θ,L,ω). Therefore, if the value function
S and an equilibrium of the contract-posting game exist, then S ∈ C0
[θ,θ]×[0,1]×Ω: the typical
ﬁrm’s value function is continuous in θ and L, increasing and convex in L and has increasing
diﬀerences in (θ,L). By the same standard monotone comparative statics arguments that
we invoked in the proof of Lemma 1, the maximizing correspondence is increasing in θ and
L in the strong set sense, hence all of its measurable selections are weakly increasing in θ
and L.
The proposition is ﬁnally established by the following simple induction. Consider two
ﬁrms with θ2 > θ1. By assumption, at date 0, L2 ≥ L1. Because any selection V (θ,L,ω,Λ)
from the maximizing correspondence of the typical ﬁrm’s problem is increasing in θ and L,
the values posted by those two ﬁrms at date 0 are such that V2 ≥ V1. Then because L is
strictly increasing in both L and V , ﬁrm 2 is again larger than ﬁrm 1 at date 1. The same
reasoning applies again at date 1, and at all subsequent dates, so that V2 ≥ V1 holds true at
all dates.
Finally, if ﬁrms are equally productive the RP property follows as a simple corollary of
the convexity of S in L, by the assumption that the initial Λ is continuous. ¤
We conclude with a remark on atoms in the initial size distribution, including the sym-
metric case of identical ﬁrms that are equally productive and start out with the same size.
That case would require mixed strategies in the ﬁrst period. After the mixing plays out, in
the second period of play ﬁrms would diﬀer in size, and the previous case would apply from
then on. We leave the computation of the equilibrium mixed strategies to future research.
B Proof of Proposition 3
In an attempt to simplify the notation without causing confusion, we deﬁne:
V
? (θ,ω) := V (θ,L
? (θ),ω,Λ
?)
42for use throughout this proof. This notation keeps the dependence of V (·) on Λ implicit.
The main purpose of Proposition 3 is actually to establish claim 2, continuous diﬀerentia-
bility of V ?. Our proof strategy is as follows. We know from Proposition 2 that the optimal
policy V ? is increasing in θ, hence diﬀerentiable a.e. It remains to show that it is diﬀeren-
tiable everywhere. To do so, ﬁrst, we establish continuity properties of V (θ,L,ω,Λ?) in θ,
both for ﬁxed L and for L = L? (θ), and in L at L = L? (θ) for ﬁxed θ. Using these properties,
we show that any solution to the Bellman equation when all other ﬁrms are playing a RPE,
S (θ,L,ω,Λ?), is continuously diﬀerentiable in L at L = L? (θ); that is, on the equilibrium
path the shadow marginal value of one worker always exists and is continuous in ﬁrm size.
Next, we exploit this property and the implications of RPE to show that the optimal policy
V ? is Lipschitz continuous in θ. This implies that V ? is diﬀerentiable everywhere.
We begin with an ancillary lemma, which is interesting in its own right.
Lemma 5 V has the following continuity properties along the (RP) Equilibrium path:
1. θ 7→ V (θ,L? (θ),ω,Λ?) = V ? (θ,ω) is continuous;
2. L 7→ V (θ,L,ω,Λ?) is continuous at L = L? (θ);
3. τ 7→ V (τ,L? (θ),ω,Λ?) is continuous at τ = θ.
Proof. θ 7→ V ? (θ,ω) is increasing by Proposition 2, so V ? can only have (count-
ably many) jump discontinuities. But then a jump discontinuity in V ? would
imply a gap in the support of F, which is inconsistent with equilibrium as ar-
gued in Appendix A. This proves claim 1 of the lemma.
For claim 2, ﬁx θ and ε > 0. Then by continuity of V ? (point 1 of this
lemma), ∃α > 0 : ∀η ∈ (0,α], V ? (θ,ω) ≤ V ? (θ + η,ω) ≤ V ? (θ,ω) + ε.
But then monotonicity of V in L and in θ (see Appendix A) further implies:
V ? (θ,ω) ≤ V (θ,L? (θ + η),ω,Λ?) ≤ V ? (θ + η,ω) ≤ V ? (θ,ω) + ε, so that
∀L ∈ [L? (θ),L? (θ + η)], V (θ,L,ω,Λ?) − V (θ,L? (θ),ω,Λ?) ≤ ε, which estab-
lishes right-continuity of V in L at L? (θ). Left-continuity is established in the
same way, and so is continuity of τ 7→ V (τ,L? (θ),ω,Λ?) at τ = θ. ¤
We now go on to establish point 1 of the proposition. In so doing, to avoid notational
overload, we will keep the dependence of all value functions and laws of motion on Λ? im-
plicit. Now ﬁrst, convexity of S w.r.t. L was established as a by-product of Proposition
2 (see Appendix A), and implies that S is everywhere left- and right-diﬀerentiable w.r.t.
L, and that the right and left derivatives SL,r and SL,` are both increasing functions of
L. As such they have right and left limits everywhere. We can thus deﬁne SL,r (θ,L+,ω) =
43limh→0+ SL,r (θ,L + h,ω), and symmetrically SL,` (θ,L−,ω) = limh→0+ SL,` (θ,L − h,ω). Now
following exactly the same steps as in (30) and (31) (see the proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix
A), only applied to S, we establish:
SL,r
¡
θ,L
+,ω
¢
= ωθ + β
Z
Ω
δ
ω0
U (ω
0)H (dω
0 | ω)
+ β
Z
Ω
*
SL,r
£
θ,L
¡
L,ω
0,V
¡
θ,L
+,ω
0¢¢
,ω
0¤
· LL
¡
L,ω
0,V
¡
θ,L
+,ω
0¢¢
+
³
1 − δ
ω0´
λ
ω0
1
Z +∞
V (θ,L+,ω0)
vdF (v | ω
0)
+
H (dω
0 | ω).
Next, the facts that V is increasing in L (see the proof of Proposition 2) and continu-
ous in L at L = L? (θ) (from Lemma 5), combined with continuity of L and LL w.r.t.
V (by continuity of F), imply that LL (L,ω0,V (θ,L+,ω0)) = LL (L,ω0,V (θ,L,ω0)) and
SL,r [θ,L (L,ω0,V (θ,L+,ω0)),ω0] = SL,r
£
θ,L (L,ω0,V (θ,L,ω0))
+ ,ω0¤
at L = L? (θ). As a
further consequence:
SL,r
¡
θ,L
? (θ)
+ ,ω
¢
= ωθ + β
Z
Ω
δ
ω0
U (ω
0)H (dω
0 | ω)
+ β
Z
Ω
*
SL,r
h
θ,L (L,ω
0,V
? (θ,ω
0))
+ ,ω
0
i
· LL (L,ω
0,V
? (θ,ω
0))
+
³
1 − δ
ω0´
λ
ω0
1
Z +∞
V ?(θ,ω0)
vdF (v | ω
0)
+
H (dω
0 | ω). (33)
A symmetric expression can be arrived at in the same way for SL,`
¡
θ,L? (θ)
− ,ω
¢
, so that
deﬁning DSL (θ,L,ω) := SL,r (θ,L+,ω) − SL,` (θ,L−,ω), which is positive by convexity of S
in L, we have:
0 ≤ DSL (θ,L
? (θ),ω) = β
Z
Ω
DSL [θ,L (L,ω
0,V
? (θ,ω
0)),ω
0] · LL (L,ω
0,V
? (θ,ω
0))H (dω
0 | ω)
< β
Z
Ω
DSL [θ,L (L,ω
0,V
? (θ,ω
0)),ω
0]H (dω
0 | ω).
At this point, if we can prove that DSL is uniformly bounded above by some K > 0, then
iterating the last inequality will show that 0 ≤ DSL (θ,L? (θ),ω) < βnK for all n ∈ N, which
implies that DSL (θ,L? (θ),ω) = 0 for all (θ,ω) and that SL exists everywhere. Since S is
convex, SL is increasing, hence it can only have jumps up. But we just concluded that its
right and left limit are equal everywhere, so SL is continuous for all L ∈
£
0, ¯ L
¢
, thus proving
point 1 of the proposition.
We still need to show that DSL is uniformly bounded above. Because SL,` ≥ 0, it suﬃces
to show that SL,r is bounded above. The following series of inequalities use the facts that
44SL,r is increasing in L (by convexity of S), that L ≤ 1 (since the total mass of workers in
the economy is 1), and that SL,r (θ,L? (θ),ω) ≥ SL,` (θ,L? (θ),ω) ≥ V ? (θ,ω) ≥ U (ω) again
invoking convexity in conjunction with the FOC (29):
SL,r
¡
θ,L
+,ω
¢
≤ SL,r (θ,1,ω)
≤ωθ + β
Z
Ω
δ
ω0
U (ω
0)H (dω
0 | ω) + β
Z
Ω
*
SL,r (θ,1,ω
0) ·
³
1 − δ
ω0´³
1 − λ
ω0
1 F (V
? (θ,ω
0))
´
+
³
1 − δ
ω0´
λ
ω0
1
Z +∞
V ?(θ,ω0)
vdF (v | ω
0)
+
H (dω
0 | ω)
≤ωθ + β
Z
Ω
δ
ω0
U (ω
0)H (dω
0 | ω) + β
Z
Ω
³
1 − δ
ω0´
SL,r (θ,1,ω
0)H (dω
0 | ω)
≤ωθ + β
Z
Ω
SL,r (θ,1,ω
0)H (dω
0 | ω).
This establishes that SL,r (θ,1,ω) ≤ maxΩ ωθ/(1 − β) for all ω, and so maxΩ ωθ/(1 − β) is
also a uniform upper bound for SL,r (θ,L? (θ),ω). This completes the proof of point 1 in the
proposition.
We now go straight to point 3 before proving point 2. Consider the problem of a ﬁrm
choosing W to best-respond to all other ﬁrms playing a RPE. By a simple improvement
argument, W ∈
£
V ? (θ,ω0),V ? ¡
θ,ω0¢¤
. Since V ? is continuous and increasing, then oﬀering
any such best response W is equivalent to choosing a type τ to imitate such that W =
V ? (τ,ω0). In any RPE, by Proposition 2, the best response by a ﬁrm θ of current size L? (θ)
is ‘truthful revelation’, τ? = θ, which solves
S (θ,L
? (θ),ω) = A(θ,L
? (θ),ω)
+ β
Z
Ω
max
τ(ω0)
hS [θ,L (L
? (θ),ω
0,τ (ω
0)),ω
0] + B (L
? (θ),ω
0,τ (ω
0))iH (dω
0 | ω)
where, with a slight abuse of notation:
L (L,ω
0,τ) = L
³
1 − δ
ω0´³
1 − λ
ω0
1 F (V
? (τ,ω
0) | ω
0)
´
+ λ
ω0
0
¡
1 − Λ
? ¡
θ
¢¢
+ λ
ω0
1
³
1 − δ
ω0´
Λ
? ¡
θ
¢
G(V
? (τ,ω
0) | ω
0)
and
B (L,ω
0,τ) = L
³
1 − δ
ω0´
λ
ω0
1
Z +∞
V ?(τ,ω0)
vdF (v | ω
0)
− V
? (τ,ω
0)
³
λ
ω0
0
¡
1 − Λ
? ¡
θ
¢¢
+ λ
ω0
1
³
1 − δ
ω0´
Λ
? ¡
θ
¢
G(V
? (τ,ω
0) | ω
0)
´
45are continuous functions of L and τ. Using the RP property
L (L
? (θ),ω
0,τ) =L
? (θ)
³
1 − δ
ω0´³
1 − λ
ω0
1 Γ(τ)
´
+ λ
ω0
0
¡
1 − Λ
? ¡
θ
¢¢
+ λ
ω0
1
³
1 − δ
ω0´
Λ
? (τ)
(34)
B (L
? (θ),ω
0,τ) =L
? (θ)
³
1 − δ
ω0´
λ
ω0
1
Z θ
τ
V
? (x,ω
0)dΓ(x)
− V
? (τ,ω
0)
³
λ
ω0
0
¡
1 − Λ
? ¡
θ
¢¢
+ λ
ω0
1
³
1 − δ
ω0´
Λ
? (τ)
´
.
Lemma 6 V ? is Lipschitz continuous, hence absolutely continuous and V ? (θ,ω0) =
R θ V ?0 (x,ω0)dx.
Proof. Fix θ and ω0. Optimality requires for all h > 0:
S [θ,L (L
? (θ),ω
0,θ − h,ω
0)] + L
? (θ)
³
1 − δ
ω0´
λ
ω0
1
Z θ
θ−h
V
? (x,ω
0)dΓ(x)
− V
? (θ − h,ω
0)
³
λ
ω0
0
¡
1 − Λ
? ¡
θ
¢¢
+ λ
ω0
1
³
1 − δ
ω0´
Λ
? (θ − h)
´
≤ S [θ,L (L
? (θ),ω
0,θ),ω
0] + L
? (θ)
³
1 − δ
ω0´
λ
ω0
1
Z θ
θ
V
? (x,ω
0)dΓ(x)
− V
? (θ,ω
0)
³
λ
ω0
0
¡
1 − Λ
? ¡
θ
¢¢
+ λ
ω0
1
³
1 − δ
ω0´
Λ
? (θ)
´
.
Rearranging:
[V
? (θ,ω
0) − V
? (θ − h,ω
0)] ·
h
λ
ω0
0
¡
1 − Λ
? ¡
θ
¢¢
+ λ
ω0
1
³
1 − δ
ω0´
Λ
? (θ)
i
≤ S [θ,L (L
? (θ),ω
0,θ),ω
0] − S [θ,L (L
? (θ),ω
0,θ − h),ω
0]
− λ
ω0
1
³
1 − δ
ω0´½
L
? (θ)
Z θ
θ−h
V
? (x,ω
0)dΓ(x) + V
? (θ − h,ω
0) · [Λ
? (θ) − Λ
? (θ − h)]
¾
≤ S [θ,L (L
? (θ),ω
0,θ),ω
0] − S [θ,L (L
? (θ),ω
0,θ − h),ω
0]
− V
? (θ − h,ω
0) · λ
ω0
1
³
1 − δ
ω0´
{L
? (θ)[Γ(θ) − Γ(θ − h)] + [Λ
? (θ) − Λ
? (θ − h)],}
(35)
where the second inequality is obtained by minorizing the integral term, remark-
ing that V ? is increasing in θ. Now diﬀerentiability of S w.r.t. L and the deﬁnition
(34) together imply that:14
S [θ,L (L
? (θ),θ,ω
0),ω
0]−S [θ,L (L
? (θ),θ − h,ω
0),ω
0] = SL [θ,L (L
? (θ),θ,ω
0),ω
0]
× λ
ω0
1
³
1 − δ
ω0´
{L
? (θ)[Γ(θ) − Γ(θ − h)] + [Λ
? (θ) − Λ
? (θ − h)]} + o(h).
14The o(h) term at the end comes from o(L (L? (θ),ω0,θ) − L (L? (θ),ω0,θ − h)) =
o(L? (θ)[Γ(θ) − Γ(θ − h)] + [Λ? (θ) − Λ? (θ − h)]) = o(h) by diﬀerentiability of Γ and Λ?.
46Substituting into (35), we obtain:
[V
? (θ,ω
0) − V
? (θ − h,ω
0)] ·
h
λ
ω0
0
¡
1 − Λ
? ¡
θ
¢¢
+ λ
ω0
1
³
1 − δ
ω0´
Λ
? (θ)
i
≤ {SL [θ,L (L
? (θ),ω
0,θ),ω
0] − V
? (θ − h,ω
0)}
× λ
ω0
1
³
1 − δ
ω0´
{L
? (θ)[Γ(θ) − Γ(θ − h)] + [Λ
? (θ) − Λ
? (θ − h)]} + o(h)
Now dividing through by h > 0 and taking the limit superior:
0 ≤ D
−V
? (θ) ≤ 2λ
ω0
1
³
1 − δ
ω0´
L
? (θ)γ (θ)
SL [θ,L (L? (θ),ω0,θ),ω0] − V ? (θ,ω0)
λω0
0
¡
1 − Λ? ¡
θ
¢¢
+ λω0
1 (1 − δω0)Λ? (θ)
(the ﬁrst inequality is a direct consequence of V ? being increasing). All terms in
the r.h.s. are uniformly bounded above (γ (θ) by assumption and SL by a property
established earlier in this proof). So V ? is a continuous function with bounded
(upper-left) Dini derivative, which is suﬃcient to ensure Lipschitz-continuity (see,
e.g., Problem 20.c p112 in Royden, 1988). ¤
We are ﬁnally in a position to prove claim 2 of the proposition, namely that in any RPE,
V ? (θ) is continuously diﬀerentiable. Because V ? is increasing, we know that V ?
θ exists outside
of a null set, say NV. Therefore, for each θ ∈
£
θ,θ
¤
\NV we can take a derivative in the
Bellman equation and write a NFOC:
V
?
θ (θ,ω
0) = 2λ
ω0
1
³
1 − δ
ω0´
L
? (θ)γ (θ)
SL [θ,L (L? (θ),ω0,θ),ω0] − V ? (θ,ω0)
λω0
0
¡
1 − Λ? ¡
θ
¢¢
+ λω0
1 (1 − δω0)Λ? (θ)
:= q (θ).
Notice that the RHS q (θ) is continuous in θ, where it exists, i.e. in the set
£
θ,θ
¤
\NV (recall
that L? is continuous by the assumption that L0 is). Since
£
θ,θ
¤
\NV is the complement of a
set of measure 0, it is dense in
£
θ,θ
¤
. Therefore, for all θ ∈ NV, there exists a sequence {θn},
θn ∈
£
θ,θ
¤
\NV such that θn → θ. As V ?
θ (θn,ω0) exists and equals q (θn) for all θn in this
sequence, using the NFOC and continuity of q: limn→∞ V ?
θ (θn,ω0) = limn→∞ q (θn) = q (θ).
Let
˜ Vθ (θ) :=
½
V ?
θ (θ,ω0) θ ∈
£
θ,θ
¤
\NV
q (θ) otherwise
which, by the last argument, is continuous everywhere. Then,
V
? (θ,ω
0) = V
? (θ,ω
0) +
Z θ
θ
V
?
θ (x,ω
0)dx = V
? (θ,ω
0) +
Z θ
θ
˜ Vθ (x)dx
where the second equality follows from the fact that V ?
θ (θ,ω0) 6= ˜ Vθ (θ) only on a null
set. So V ? (θ,ω0) is the integral of a continuous function ˜ Vθ, hence it is diﬀerentiable with
V ?
θ (θ,ω0) = ˜ Vθ (θ) everywhere, and the FOC V ?
θ (θ,ω0) = q (θ) holds everywhere. Point 3 of
the proposition is thus proven.
47Finally on to point 2. Introducing a time index τ and using the notation
Λ
?
τ+1 = T (ωτ+1,Λ
?
τ)
∆(θ,ωτ) = (1 − δ
ωτ)
¡
1 − λ
ωτ
1 Γ(θ)
¢
U (θ,ωτ,Λ
?
τ) = Eωτ+1|ωτ
"
δ
ωτ+1U
¡
ωτ+1,Λ
?
τ+1
¢
+(1 − δ
ωτ+1)λ
ωτ+1
1
Z +∞
θ
V
? ¡
x | ωτ+1,Λ
?
τ+1
¢
dΓ(x)
¸
,
and: µ(θ,ωτ,Λ
?
τ) = SL (θ,L
?
τ (θ),ωτ,Λ
?
τ),
we can rewrite the Euler equation (33) as follows:
µ(θ,ωt,Λ
?
t) = ωtθ + βU (θ,ωt,Λ
?
t) + βEωt+1|ωt
£
∆(θ,ωt+1)µ
¡
θ,ωt+1,Λ
?
t+1
¢¤
. (36)
For any measurable function φ of ω and any t, deﬁne recursively the linear operator Xt
0 [φ] = φ
and
X
t
s [φ] = Eωt+s|ωt+s−1
£
∆(θ,ωt+s)X
t
s−1 [φ]
¤
for s = 1,2···n − 1.
After n forward substitutions, we can write (36) as
µ(θ,ωt,Λ
?
t) = µn (θ,ωt,Λ
?
t) + β
n+1X
t
n+1 [µ]
where
µn (θ,ωt,Λ
?
t) =
n X
s=0
β
s ©
X
t
s+1 [ωθ] + βX
t
s+1 [U (θ,ω,Λ
?)]
ª
.
Since µ > 0 and ∆ ∈ (0,1) with probability 1
0 <µ(θ,ωt,Λ
?
t) − µn (θ,ωt,Λ
?
t) = |µ(θ,ωt,Λ
?
t) − µn (θ,ωt,Λ
?
t)| = β
n+1X
t
n+1 [µ]
≤β
n+1Eωt+1|ωt
£
Eωt+2|ωt+1
£
···Eωt+n|ωt+n−1
£
µ
¡
θ,ωt+n,Λ
?
t+n
¢¤¤¤
= β
n+1Eωt+n|ωt
£
µ
¡
θ,ωt+n,Λ
?
t+n
¢¤
Since a ﬁrm can always guarantee itself positive proﬁts and employment by oﬀering its work-
ers the value of unemployment, then L? (θ,ω,Λ?) is bounded away from 0 with probability
one. So the TVC (22) implies that, as n → ∞, the last term vanishes, thus µn converges
pointwise (and indeed uniformly) to µ.
Next, taking derivatives
∂µn (θ,ωt,Λ?
t)
∂θ
= ωt +
λω
1γ (θ)
1 − λω
1Γ(θ)
+
n X
s=1
β
sX
t
s
·
ω +
λω
1γ (θ)
1 − λω
1Γ(θ)
ωθ
¸
+
n+1 X
s=2
β
sX
t
s
·
λω
1γ (θ)
1 − λω
1Γ(θ)
U (θ,ω,Λ
?) − (1 − δ
ω)λ
ω
1V
? (θ | ω,Λ
?)γ (θ)
¸
48which is continuous in θ. As the arguments of the operator Xt
s in the last expression are
continuous in ω,θ on the compact set Ω ×
£
θ,θ
¤
, the Xt
s [·] terms in the sums are bounded
above and below uniformly with probability 1 by some upper bound X0 < ∞ and lower bound
−X0 for all (θ,ωt). Therefore, driven by discounting, the two sums converge as n → ∞, and
lim
n→∞
∂µn (θ,ωt,Λ?
t)
∂θ
=
∂µ∞ (θ,ωt,Λ?
t)
∂θ
exists for all θ,ωt,Λ?
t. Also
∂µn (θ,ωt,Λ?
t)
∂θ
−
∂µ∞ (θ,ωt,Λ?
t)
∂θ
= −
∞ X
s=n+1
β
sX
t
s
·
ω +
λω
1γ (θ)
1 − λω
1Γ(θ)
ωθ
¸
−
∞ X
s=n+2
β
sX
t
s
·
λω
1γ (θ)
1 − λω
1Γ(θ)
U (θ,ω,Λ
?) − (1 − δ
ω)λ
ω
1V
? (θ | ω,Λ
?)γ (θ)
¸
So, for all θ,ωt,Λ?
t, |Xt
s [·]| < X0 implies
¯
¯
¯
¯
∂µn (θ,ωt,Λ?
t)
∂θ
−
∂µ∞ (θ,ωt,Λ?
t)
∂θ
¯
¯
¯
¯ < X
0βn+1 + βn+2
1 − β
so that convergence of derivatives is uniform. By Theorem 7.17 in Rudin (1976), conclude
that µ is continuously diﬀerentiable in θ with:
∂µ(θ,ωt,Λ?
t)
∂θ
=
∂µ∞ (θ,ωt,Λ?
t)
∂θ
,
which completes the proof of the proposition. ¤
C Proof of Proposition 4
We ﬁrst show that the limit in (24) exists, is positive and uniformly bounded above. By
assumpion, ωθ and bω are positive and uniformly bounded above by some K < ∞, therefore
by the deﬁnition of T, T
¡ωθ
bω
¢
is also positive and uniformly bounded above by K, and by
induction the same is true of Tj¡ωθ
bω
¢
. Hence the sequence
Pn−1
j=0 βjTj¡ωθ
bω
¢
is increasing and
uniformly bounded above by K/(1 − β), so each of the two sums in this sequence must
converge and the limit exists and is positive and bounded above by K/(1 − β).
We next show that, if there exists a RPE, then it is given by (24). Suppose there
exists a RPE
¡µ
U
¢
. Then by deﬁnition of RPE µ ≥ TV [µ,U] ≥ U ≥ 0 and TV [µ,U] is
increasing in θ. Then, by inspection of Tµ: µt
¡
θ | ω
¢
= ωθ + βTµ
¡µ
U
¢¡
θ | ω
¢
≤ ωθ +
βEωt+1|ωt
£
µt+1
¡
θ | ωt+1
¢¤
. Since Eωt+1|ωt [µt+1] ≥ 0, iterating T forward and using the TVC:
0 ≤ β
nT
n
µ [µ,U]
¡
θ | ω
¢
≤ β
nEωt+n|ωt
£
µt+n
¡
θ | ωt+n
¢¤
−→ 0,
49so that µ
¡
θ | ω
¢
≤ ωθ/(1 − β) ≤ K/(1 − β). By Proposition 3, in any RPE ∂µ/∂θ exists;
the proof of Proposition 2 shows that S has increasing diﬀerences in (θ,L), so that µ = SL
is increasing in θ. So for all θ, 0 ≤ U ≤ µ(θ | ω) ≤ K/(1 − β) and
¡µ
U
¢
is uniformly
bounded above. By deﬁnition of a RPE,
¡µ
U
¢
must solve (23). Substituting forward in (23)
and using U ≤ µ(θ | ω) ≤ K/(1 − β) we ﬁnd 0 ≤ βnTn¡µ
U
¢
≤ βnK/(1 − β) → 0, so that
¡µ
U
¢
=
¡ωθ
bω
¢
+ βT
¡ωθ
bω
¢
+ β2T2¡µ
U
¢
= ··· =
¡µ?
U?
¢
as claimed.
We ﬁnally turn to existence. By construction,
¡µ?
U?
¢
solves (23). Moreover, since
¡µ?
U?
¢
is uniformly bounded above, it satisﬁes the TVC. So we only have to show that it satisﬁes
0 ≤ U? ≤ TV [µ?,U?] and TV [µ?,U?] increasing in θ. By deﬁnition of TV:
∂TV [µ?,U?]
∂θ
(θ | ω) =
∂Qt
∂θ (θ | ω)
Qt (θ | ω)
(µ
? (θ | ω) − TV [µ
?,U
?](θ | ω))
=
∂Qt
∂θ (θ | ω)
Qt (θ | ω)
Ã
µ
? (θ | ω) − U
? (ω) −
Z θ
θ
(µ
? (x | ω) − U
? (ω))
∂Qt
∂θ (x | ω)
Qt (θ | ω)
dx
!
so it suﬃces to prove that µ? (θ | ω) ≥ U (ω) and µ? is increasing in θ. Now consider the
sequence of functions {µn,Un}n∈N deﬁned by µ0 (θ | ω) = ωθ, U0 (ω) = bω, and
¡µn+1
Un+1
¢
=
¡ωθ
bω
¢
+ βT
¡µn
Un
¢
. Clearly this sequence converges to
¡µ?
U?
¢
. Suppose µn is increasing in θ and
greater than Un for some n. It is straightforward to see from the deﬁnition of Tµ that µn+1
is increasing in θ. Then:
µn+1 (θ | ω) − Un+1 (ω) = (ωθ − b
ω) + (Tµ [µn,Un](θ | ω) − TU [µn,Un](ω)).
The condition ωθ ≥ bω in all states ensures that the ﬁrst term is positive, while the conditions
(1 − δω)λω
1 ≥ λω
0 guarantees that the second terms is also positive. ¤
D Details of the simulation algorithm
This appendix illustrates in detail the projection method that we use to solve for the shadow
values µ and π in the PDE system (25,26) in each aggregate state ωt = ω. Rewrite (25) as:
∂µt
∂θ
(θ | ω) = ω + β (1 − δ
ω)
·
λ
ω
1γ (θ)πt+1 (θ | ω) +
∂µt+1
∂θ
(θ | ω)
¡
1 − λ
ω
1Γ(θ)
¢
¸
+ βσ
ω
(
³
1 − δ
ω0´·
λ
ω0
1 γ (θ)πt+1 (θ | ω
0) +
∂µt+1
∂θ
(θ | ω
0)
³
1 − λ
ω0
1 Γ(θ)
´¸
− (1 − δ
ω)
·
λ
ω
1γ (θ)πt+1 (θ | ω) +
∂µt+1
∂θ
(θ | ω)
¡
1 − λ
ω
1Γ(θ)
¢
¸)
. (37)
As explained in the main text, the idea is to approximate cross-state jumps in those
shadow values by a known function. The “jump term” that we need to approximate is the
50last term in curly brackets in (37), that we denote by J (θ,L? (θ),ω,Λ? (θ) | a). Given a
speciﬁc vector of coeﬃcients a, system (26,37), together with the transversality condition
(22), becomes a pair of independent systems of PDEs, one for each aggregate state, which can
be separately numerically solved over the inﬁnite future for any initial value of (Λ? (·),L? (·))
using the algorithm described in MPV08. We thus proceed in the following steps:
0. Pick an initial state of the economy (ω0,Λ0 (·),L0 (·)) and simulate a path of ω. Denote
switching dates as (s1,s2,...).
1. Fix a parameter a.
2. Given the choice of a made at step 1 and the implied J-function, solve (26,37,22) using
the appropriate initial conditions. More speciﬁcally:
(a) Solve (26,37,22) with initial condition (Λ0 (·),L0 (·)) as if state ω0 prevailed for-
ever. This implies certain values for ∂µ0 (θ | ω0)/∂θ, ∂µs1 (θ | ω0)/∂θ, π0 (θ | ω0),
πs1 (θ | ω0) and
¡
Λ?
s1 (·),L?
s1 (·)
¢
at date s1 when the next aggregate shock occurs.
(b) Solve (26,37,22) with initial condition
¡
Λ?
s1 (·),L?
s1 (·)
¢
as if state ω1 prevailed over
t ∈ [s1,+∞). This implies certain values for ∂µs1 (θ | ω1)/∂θ, ∂µs2 (θ | ω1)/∂θ,
πs1 (θ | ω1), πs2 (θ | ω1) and
¡
Λ?
s2 (·),L?
s2 (·)
¢
.
(c) Solve (26,37,22) with initial condition
¡
Λ?
s2 (·),L?
s2 (·)
¢
as if state ω2 prevailed over
t ∈ [s2,+∞), etc. That is, repeat step 2, mutatis mutandis, for the ﬁrst K jumps
in ω (in practice with a two-state process for ω, two jumps — one up, one down
— are enough).
3. The simulations in step 2 provide a vector of jumps in ∂µ/∂θ: for k = 1,··· ,K
³
1 − δ
ω0´·
λ
ω0
1 γ (θ)πsk (θ | ω
0) +
∂µsk
∂θ
(θ | ω
0)
³
1 − λ
ω0
1 Γ(θ)
´¸
− (1 − δ
ω)
·
λ
ω
1γ (θ)πsk (θ | ω) +
∂µsk
∂θ
(θ | ω)
¡
1 − λ
ω
1Γ(θ)
¢
¸
. (38)
Compare those with the jumps predicted from the initially chosen function J (· | a) and
the simulated path of (ω,L? (·),Λ? (·)). If diﬀerent, update a and start over at step 1.
Exactly how a is updated depends on the chosen functional form for the approximate
jump function J. In practice we use a projection on polynomials,15 and the updated
vector of coeﬃcients a is obtained by regression of the “simulated jumps” in (38) on
the elements of J.
15After many trials, a good compromise between accuracy and speed of convergence was found using
projection on degree-ﬁve polynomials in θ × Λ? (θ) and θ × L? (θ). With that speciﬁcation the root mean
squared prediction error is in the order of 1/100th of a percent of the mean (absolute value) simulated jump.
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